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I build a simple dynamic model of the formation of an international social network of importers and
exporters. Firms can only export into markets in which they have a contact. They acquire new contacts
both at random, and via their network of existing contacts. This model explains (i) the cross-sectional
distribution of the number of foreign markets accessed by individual exporters, (ii) the cross-sectional
geographic distribution of foreign contacts, and (iii) the dynamics of firm level exports. I show that
the firm level dynamics of trade can explain the observed cross section of firm level exports. All theoretical
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Abstract
Ib u i l das i m p l ed y n a m i cm o d e lo ft h ef o r m a t i o no fa ni n t e r n a t i o n a ls o c i a ln e t w o r ko f
importers and exporters. Firms can only export into markets in which they have a contact.
They acquire new contacts both at random, and via their network of existing contacts. This
model explains (i) the cross-sectional distribution of the number of foreign markets accessed
by individual exporters, (ii) the cross-sectional geographic distribution of foreign contacts,
and (iii) the dynamics of ﬁrm level exports. I show that the ﬁrm level dynamics of trade
can explain the observed cross section of ﬁrm level exports. All theoretical predictions are
supported by the data.
Introduction
Individual ﬁrms diﬀer hugely in their exposure to international trade. Most ﬁrms do not export
abroad. Of those which do, only few export to a large number of countries. This heterogeneity
in the access to foreign markets of individual ﬁrms has dramatic implications for the patterns
of international trade. Melitz (2003) shows that, in the presence of heterogeneity in the ability
of individual ﬁrms to access foreign markets, a reduction in trade barriers can induce aggregate
productivity gains. Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003) and Chaney (2008) show that
with ﬁrm heterogeneity, ﬁrm level exports aggregate up to the well established gravity equations
in international trade, but that the sensitivity of trade ﬂows with respect to trade barriers is
magniﬁed. The source of this heterogeneity in the ability of individual ﬁrms to access foreign
markets however remains largely unexplained. Whereas Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum
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1(2003) or Melitz (2003) assume that this heterogeneity is entirely driven by productivity diﬀerences,
Armenter and Koren (2009) point out that productivity diﬀerences can only account for a fraction
of the exposure to international markets.
In this paper, I oﬀer a simple explanation for the heterogeneous ability of individual ﬁrms
to access foreign markets based on the formation of an international social network. Individual
exporters meet foreign importers both at random and through their network of existing foreign
contacts. The cross-sectional predictions of the model on both the distribution of the number
of foreign contacts, and on the geographic distribution of foreign contacts are supported by the
data. Furthermore, this model generates novel predictions for the dynamic evolution of trade
ﬂows. I show how the entry of individual exporters into a given country is inﬂuenced by changes
in aggregate trade ﬂows between third countries, in a way that is consistent with the model and
with the cross-sectional evidence on the distribution of foreign contacts.
I extend the social network model of Jackson and Rogers (2007). Potential exporters meet
foreign contacts in two distinct ways. First, they can meet foreign contacts at random, which
is a reduced form for the active search for foreign trading partners. Second, once a ﬁrm has
acquired some foreign contacts, it can meet the contacts of those contacts. This process generates
predictions for the steady state distribution of the number of foreign contacts across exporters,
and for the geographic distribution of these contacts across exporters.
The possibility to use existing contacts to ﬁnd new ones gives an advantage to ﬁrms with
many contacts. This generates a fat tailed distribution of the number of contacts across ﬁrms.
The key parameter that shapes the cross-sectional distribution of the number of contacts is the
relative importance of random versus network-based meetings. The empirical distribution of the
number of foreign contacts is well described by the theoretical model. This allows me to estimate
the relative importance of random versus network-based meetings. Moreover, direct evidence on
the time-series evolution of ﬁrm level trade ﬂows conﬁrms the assumed mechanism. I ﬁnd that
the more contacts a ﬁrm has, the more likely it is to acquire additional contacts. I tie together
quantitatively the cross-sectional and time-series evidence on ﬁrm level trade.
The more novel contribution of this paper is that the network formation is embedded into
geographic space. Network-based meetings allow say a French exporter that has a acquired a
contact in Japan to radiate away from Japan as Japanese ﬁrms would. It does so by using its
Japanese contacts as a remote hub from which it can expand out of Japan. The theory therefore
2predicts that as ﬁrms acquire more foreign contacts, they expand into more remote countries,
so that their exports become geographically more dispersed. The speed at which the geographic
dispersion of foreign contacts increases depends on the relative importance of random versus
network-based meetings. The geographic dispersion of foreign contacts increases with the number
of foreign contacts in a way that is quantitatively in line with the theory and the cross-sectional
distribution of the number of foreign contacts.
This is a theory of a network. Therefore, a shock that hits anywhere will be transmitted to all
the components in the network, with an intensity that depends on the structure of the network.
I ﬁnd empirical support for these novel predictions on the dynamics of ﬁrm level trade ﬂows. For
instance, I show that an increase in the volume of trade between country a and b will have a
positive impact on the probability that a French ﬁrm that already exports to a starts exporting
to b, but not on ﬁrms that do not export to country a yet. The magnitude of this eﬀect is in line
qualitatively and quantitatively with the theory and the cross-sectional distribution of the number
of foreign contacts.
This paper contributes to the literature on both international trade and social networks.
There is a nascent literature in international trade on the role that social networks and in-
formational barriers play in facilitating or hampering transactions. In a seminal paper, Rauch
and Trindade (2002) show that the presence of ethnic Chinese networks facilitates bilateral trade.
Moreover, they show that this eﬀect is more pronounced for trade in diﬀerentiated goods than for
trade in homogeneous goods. They argue that these ﬁndings are evidence for the importance of
informational barriers, and that social networks mitigate those barriers. In the context of intra-
national trade, Combes, Lafourcade and Mayer (2005) show that social and business networks
facilitate trade between regions within France. Burchardi and Hassan (2010) show that West Ger-
man regions that have closer social ties with East Germany experienced faster growth and engaged
in more investment into East Germany after the German reuniﬁcation. On a somewhat related
topic, Hidalgo, Klinger, Barabási and Hausmann (2007) show that the product mix manufactured
and exported by countries can be described as a network, and that countries move towards more
connected sectors when they grow. In this paper, I develop a more general model of the forma-
tion of an international network of ﬁrms, and show how this network matters for ﬁrm level trade
patterns, over and beyond the eﬀects analyzed in the relatively narrow special cases studied so
far.
3This paper is also related to the recent literature that emphasises the importance of infor-
mational barriers in international trade and the role of trade intermediaries in overcoming those
barriers. Antràs and Costinot (2010) develop a theoretical model of trade that relaxes the assump-
tion of a centralized Walrasian market, and derive predictions for the welfare gains from trade in
a setting where trade is intermediated. Ahn, Khandelwal and Wei (2010) demonstrate empirically
the importance of trade intermediaries in facilitating trade, especially for smaller exporters and for
penetrating less accessible markets. I do not formally introduce trade intermediaries, but I stress
the importance of informational barriers, and show how a social network can partially overcome
these barriers. The network I describe can be thought of as a formal treatment of the way in which
trade intermediaries connect importers and exporters.
This paper is complementary to models of international trade with heterogeneous ﬁrms such
as Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003), Melitz (2003) and its extension in Chaney (2008).
Those models assume that diﬀerences in the ability of individual ﬁrms to enter foreign markets are
entirely driven by some exogenous productivity diﬀerences, and by the conﬁguration of exogenous
parameters that govern the accessibility of diﬀerent foreign markets. These models successfully
replicate a series of stylized facts regarding the size distribution of individual ﬁrms in diﬀerent
markets and the eﬃciency of ﬁrms entering diﬀerent sets of countries, as shown by Eaton, Kortum
and Kramarz (2010). But they take as exogenous all the parameters that govern the entry of ﬁrms
into diﬀerent markets. In other words, these models are successful at explaining the intensive
margin of trade at the ﬁrm level, but are silent about the determinants of the extensive margin
of trade. Moreover, these models are unable to match simultaneously the diﬀerent stylized facts I
uncover regarding the distribution of the number and the geographic location of foreign markets
entered by diﬀerent ﬁrms. By contrast, the model I develop oﬀers a parsimonious explanation for
the extensive margin of trade at the ﬁrm level, but is silent about the intensive margin of trade.
Because this model is analytically tractable, it would be easy to combine it with a Melitz-type
model, and explain both the extensive and intensive margins of trade. In that sense, this model
is complementary to the models of trade with heterogeneous ﬁrms.
Finally, this paper is related to the literature on social networks. I develop a spatial extension
of the model of social network in Jackson and Rogers (2007). They propose a tractable way
to combine the features of a random network and a preferential network.1 The main theoretical
1See Erdös and Rényi (1959) for a seminal description of random networks, and Barabási and Albert (1999) for
a description of preferential networks that exhibit scale-free degree distributions. See Jackson (2010) for a thorough
overview of models of social networks.
4innovation of my model is to embed this general network into space. For the purpose of this paper,
I assume that this space corresponds to the physical geographic space. But it could alternatively
correspond to any other space that describes some of the attributes of the agents connected through
that network. Existing models of social networks have been able to characterize the links formed
by agents that diﬀer only according to a small, discrete set of attributes.2 By contrast, the model I
develop is embedded in a large and potentially multi-dimensional space. I am able to characterize
who is connected with whom along dimensions outside of the network. This technical innovation
allows to treat formally various measures of social distance in social networks in a more general
way than has been done so far. I also oﬀer an empirical application of a network model to a
data-set much larger than has typically been used in the social network literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 1, I present a simple theoretical
model of the formation of an international network of importers and exporters. In section 2, I
test empirically the main theoretical predictions of the model. I relegate to the Appendix all
mathematical proofs (Appendix A), some additional economic assumptions (Appendix B), the
description of the data and robustness checks (Appendix C).
1 A simple dynamic model of network formation
In this section, I develop a simple model of the formation of an international network of importers
and exporters. This model is an extension of Jackson and Rogers (2007), where I embed the
formation of links into geographic space.
The purpose of this model is to explain the extensive margin of international trade, that is the
patterns of entry of individual exporters into diﬀerent foreign markets. I assume that individual
ﬁrms enter a foreign market if and only if they have acquired a contact in that market. The actual
trade that occurs once two ﬁrms are linked can be derived in a simple extension of the Krugman
(1980) model.3 The proposed model formalizes one particular way through which exporters enter
foreign markets: ﬁrms may either meet foreign contacts at random, or alternatively, once they have
acquired some network of foreign contacts, they can meet some of the contacts of their contacts.
2See McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook (2001) for an overview of various situations where agents tend to connect
to each other according to some attributes outside of the network, which is generally described as homophily. See
Bramoullé and Rogers (2010) for a recent model of network with homophily between two groups.
3See Appendix B page 41.
5This model delivers a series of predictions that are supported by data on ﬁrm level trade. First,
the model replicates the distribution of entry of individual ﬁrms into diﬀerent foreign markets (see
Proposition 2 and the empirical test in Section 2.2). Second, the model quantitatively matches
the increase of the geographic dispersion of exports with the number of foreign markets a ﬁrm
serves (see Proposition 3 and the empirical test in Section 2.3). Third, the main assumptions of
the model on the dynamics of ﬁrm level trade ﬂows are supported by the data (see the empirical
tests in Section 2.4).
1.1 Set-up
The formal set-up is as follows. Firms are uniformly4 distributed over a one-dimensional5 inﬁnite
space, represented by R.6 Time is discrete. The population in each location grows at the same
constant growth rate γ.7 I normalize the population at time t =0to 1 in each location.8 I
designate a ﬁrm by the pair (x,τ) ∈ R × N, where x ∈ R is the ﬁrm’s location, and τ ≥ 0 ∈ N
is the ﬁrm’s age. Once born, a ﬁrm never changes location. Firms form directed links with one
another.9 Neither ﬁrms nor links ever die.10
Before describing the formation and the evolution of this network, it will be useful to introduce
some notations. Each ﬁrm has both an out-degree distribution (the set of ﬁrms with which it has
initiated a contact), and an in-degree distribution (the set of ﬁrms that have initiated a contact
with it). I will mostly focus on the in-degree distribution of ﬁrms. The in-degree distribution of
ﬁrm (x,τ) at time t is described by a continuous distribution fx,τ,t,
fx,τ,t : R → R+ with
ˆ
R
fx,τ,t (y − x)dy ≡ Mx,τ,t
4I show numerically in Section 1.3 that all results hold for a non-uniformly distributed population.
5Note that most results hold in a space of higher dimensionality. I will consider in the empirical applications
the two-dimensional geographic space. This model can be applied to non-physical spaces, such as product spaces,
or preference spaces.
6Note that I consider an inﬁnite continuous space for analytical tractability. All the results hold numerically
in a ﬁnite discrete world, as shown in Section 1.3. I will however use the language of a discrete model to describe
the set up and the intuitions of the model. For instance, I will say that ﬁrm (x,τ) is known by exactly a number
fx,τ,t (y − x)dy of diﬀerent ﬁrms location y (strictly speaking, in a small neighborhood dy around y), it is known
by a total number of
´ b
a fx,τ,t (y − x)dy diﬀerent ﬁrms in an entire interval [a,b],a n db yat o t a ln u m b e ro fMx,τ,t
diﬀerent ﬁrms worldwide. This language is both formally rigorous, and intuitively accessible.
7All the results hold if population growth is arithmetic instead of exponential.
8Note that the total mass of ﬁrms in the system is inﬁnite, but the density of ﬁrms in each location remains well
deﬁned.
9The links are directed in the sense that I will keep track of which ﬁrm initiated a contact. I will later assume
that when a ﬁrm initiates a contact with another, it imports some amount from it. I show in Appendix B page 41
how to derive this result in a Krugman (1980) model with informational frictions.
10All results hold in a more general form if death hits ﬁrms and/or links with a constant Poisson probability.
6so that the mass of ﬁrms located in [a,b] ⊂ R that know11 ﬁrm (x,τ) at time t is
´ b
a fx,τ,t (y − x)dy.12
The in-degree of ﬁrm (x,τ) at time t, deﬁned as the total mass of ﬁrms that know (x,τ) at time
t, is then simply Mx,τ,t.13
The process through which ﬁrms acquire both an out-degree and an in-degree distribution is
purposefully simple. I assume that ﬁrms acquire their out-degree distribution in the ﬁrst period
of their life, and never alter it subsequently. So the out-degree distribution of each ﬁrm is trivial
and of no interest. All the action takes place on the in-degree distribution, with existing ﬁrms
being met by some of the newly born ﬁrms of each new cohort. The evolution of the network is
described next. Each period, newly born ﬁrms meet existing ﬁrms in two distinct ways.
First, each newly born ﬁrm in any location randomly samples a mass mr out of the existing
ﬁrms (where mr stands for random meetings). Geographic distance however aﬀects the link for-
mation in the following way. A ﬁrm in location x forms mrg (y − x)dy successful links with ﬁrms
in location y , where g is a well deﬁned symmetric probability density function. Except for the
assumption of symmetry, the p.d.f. g can have any arbitrary shape.14
Second, out of the union of the out-degree distributions of all mr ﬁrms met at random, a newly
born ﬁrm samples a mass mn of ﬁrms (where mn stands for network-based meetings).15 Trivially,
all ﬁrms have the same out-degree equal to (mr + mn).16
To further simplify the model, I use the following mean-ﬁeld approximation. I assume that the
number of links any ﬁrm receives is exactly equal to the average number of links it is supposed to
receive. In other words, I assume away the intrinsic randomness of the network formation, so that
I do not have to keep track of the probability distribution around the mean number of contacts
received by each ﬁrm. I show numerically in Section 1.3 that this approximation is precise.
With this simple process for link formation, I can now describe how the in-degree distribution
11Iw i l ls y s t e m a t i c a l l yu s et h ee x p r e s s i o n" X knows Y "i nt h es e n s et h a tX initiated a contact with Y ,a n d" X
is known by Y "i nt h es e n s et h a tY has initiated a contact with X.
12This is a model of ﬁrms meeting ﬁrms, with no a priori notion of national boundaries. As I will describe when
Ib r i n gt h i sm o d e lt ot h ed a t ai nS e c t i o n2 ,c o u n t r i e sc a nb et h o u g h ta sa r b i t r a r ys e g m e n t sp a r t i t i o n i n gt h es p a c e
of the model.
13Note that fx,τ,t is not a probability density function, since it sums up to Mx,τ,t which diﬀers from 1 in general.
14Note that geographic distance will actually hinder the formation of random links only if ∂g(|x|)/∂ |x| < 0.I
do not need to make that assumption for all |x|’s. It is for instance possible that geographic distance facilitates link
formation over some range of distances.
15This process can be rationalized in a simple model with information asymmetry, as shown in Appendix B.2.
16See Proposition 4 on page 38 in Appendix A for a formal derivation of the out-degree distribution. I am grateful
to Enghin Atalay for solving for this distribution.
7of a ﬁrm evolves.17 Given the geographic symmetry of the network, I consider a ﬁrm located at
the origin (x = 0) without loss of generality.18 Moreover, with the mean-ﬁeld approximation, the
only state variable that matters is the age of a ﬁrm. To ease notations, I will drop the location
(x = 0) and the time (t) subscripts from now on.
Assume that a ﬁrm of age τ has an in-degree distribution fτ (·). The following period, some
newly born ﬁrms will meet ﬁrm τ at random. There are γNt newly born ﬁrms in each location.
Newly born ﬁrms located in x meet mrg (0 − x)dx = mrg (x)dx ﬁrms in the origin. Since there
are Nt ﬁrms at the origin, the number of new random meetings received by ﬁrm τ originating from
location x is given by
γNtmr
Nt g (x)dx = γmrg (x)dx.
In addition, some of the newly born ﬁrms will meet ﬁrms in the in-degree distribution of ﬁrm
τ and form a link with τ through a network-based meeting. For instance, a newly born ﬁrm
located in x may meet at random a ﬁrm located in y that knows ﬁrm τ and form a link with τ
via this ﬁrm in y. A newly born ﬁrm located in x meets a total of mr ﬁrms at random. Each of
these mr ﬁrms has an out-degree of (mr + mn).E a c h ﬁ r m i n x will form a network-based link
by picking at random mn out of those mr (mr + mn) ﬁrms. Conditional on being in the union of
out-degrees of the ﬁrms randomly met by ﬁrm x, any given ﬁrm has a probability mn
mr(mr+mn) of
being chosen through one of the network-based meetings. I can now add all the pieces of network-
based meetings together. Each ﬁrm in location y is met by
γNtmr
Nt g (y − x)dy = γmrg (x − y)dx
ﬁrms from location x. The number of ﬁrms in location y that already know τ is given by fτ (y)dy,
inherited from the previous period. The number of ﬁrms located in x that form network-based
meetings with ﬁrm τ via a ﬁrm in y is then equal to γmrg (x − y)dx × fτ (y)dy × mn
mr(mr+mn).A
network-based meeting can potentially be intermediated by ﬁrms in any location y ∈ R.S ot h e
in-degree distribution of a ﬁrm of age τ evolves recursively according to,
fτ+1 (x)dx = fτ (x)dx + γmrg (x)dx + γmr
mn
mr (mr + mn)
ˆ
y∈R
g (x − y)fτ (y)dydx
or fτ+1 = fτ + γmrg +
γmn
(mr + mn)
g ∗ fτ (1)
where ∗ stands for the convolution product. This recursive structure allows me to derive a simple
analytical solution for the in-degree distribution of all ﬁrms. The following proposition describes
17In order to ensure that the initial conditions are well deﬁned for all conﬁgurations of the parameters, I assume
that each ﬁrm is born with an in-degree M0 ≥ 0.T h i si n i t i a li n - d e g r e e ,i fp r e s e n t ,i sd i s t r i b u t e do v e rs p a c ea c c o r d i n g
to the density g.T h ec o n d i t i o nM0 > 0 has to hold only in the case of purely preferential networks (mr =0 ) ,o r
else a ﬁrm would never be contacted. For simplicity, I will consider mostly cases where M0 =0 .A l l t h e r e s u l t s
hold in a slightly more general form for M0 > 0,a ss h o w ni nA p p e n d i xA .
18Trivially, f0,τ,t (y)=fx,τ,t (y + x) for any (x,y) ∈ R
2.
8this distribution.













where δ is the Dirac delta function, ∗ is the convolution product,19 γ is the growth rate of the
population, g is the geographic distribution of random contacts for newborn ﬁrms, and mr and mn
are respectively the number of random and network-based meetings of newly born ﬁrms.
fτ admits a closed form solution in the special cases where g is a Gaussian or a Cauchy
distribution.
Proof. See Appendix A page 32.
This analytical solution for the in-degree distribution of ﬁrms allows me to describe several
moments of this distribution. In the next section, I analyze two of these moments.
1.2 The number and geography of contacts
Having characterized the in-degree distribution of each ﬁrm, the following Proposition 2 charac-
terizes the distribution of the number of contacts across ﬁrms, while Proposition 3 characterizes
the geographic dispersion of these contacts.20
Proposition 2 For a population growth rate γ small, the distribution of the number of contacts,





M + r × m
￿1+r
where r = mr/mn is the ratio of random versus network-based meetings, and m =( mr + mn) is
the total number of contacts made by newly born ﬁrms.
19The exponent ∗τ stands for a distribution convoluted with itself τ times.
20Note that this model encompasses the space-less model of Jackson and Rogers (2007). Formally, this would
correspond to the case where g = δ, the Dirac delta function. A formal proof of this result can be found in the
proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix A page 32.
9Proof. See Appendix A page 34.
I show in Section 2.2 that Proposition 2 matches the data on ﬁrm level exports, with random
meetings accounting for roughly 60% of all new meetings.21
Let me brieﬂy describe the properties of the cross sectional distribution of the number of
contacts, and provide some intuition for those properties.22 The upper tail of the distribution
asymptotes to a scale-free Pareto distribution, whereas the lower tail is close to an exponential
distribution.23 Firms that already have acquired many contacts can use each and every one
of those existing contacts as a bait to "ﬁsh" for new network-based contacts. By comparison,
random meetings become a negligible fraction of their new contacts. Hence, the growth of the
number of contacts for well connected ﬁrms is roughly proportional to the number of contacts
they already have. This explains why the upper tail of the distribution converges to a scale-free
Pareto distribution. On the other hand, young ﬁrms, or ﬁrms with few existing contacts, meet
newly born ﬁrms mostly at random. The distribution in the lower tail is therefore described by a
discrete binomial distribution, which corresponds to a continuous exponential distribution.
As the relative importance of random versus network-based meetings changes, the range over
which the distribution is Pareto versus exponential changes. In the polar case where almost all
meetings are random (r → +∞), the whole distribution is exponential, whereas in the opposite
polar case where almost all meetings are network-based (r → 0), the distribution follows a Zipf
law.24 In cases in-between, the distribution is given by some mixture of these polar cases.
The characterization of the in-degree distribution in Proposition 1 not only allows me to
characterize the behavior of the total number of contacts of a ﬁrm, but also the geography of these









where fτ/Mτ is the well deﬁned probability density function of the location of a ﬁrm’s contacts.
The following proposition describes the relationship between the number of contacts and the
distance from these contacts.
21Ie s t i m a t eu s i n gﬁ r ml e v e lt r a d ed a t at h a tmr/mn ≈ 1.65,s ot h a tmr/(mr + mn) ≈ .6.
22The dynamics for the number of contacts is close to the model in Steindl (1965). It is also related to the more
elaborate models of Gabaix (1999) and Luttmer (2007).












for M small, an exponential distribution.
24See the proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix A page 34 for a formal proof of this statement.
10Proposition 3 The geographic dispersion of a ﬁrm’s contacts increases with the ﬁrm’s number of
contacts. For a population growth rate γ small, the average squared distance from a ﬁrm’s contacts


















R x2g (x)dx is the average squared distance of random contacts, r = mr/mn is the
ratio of random versus network based meetings, and m =( mr + mn) is the total number of contacts
made by newly born ﬁrms.
Proof. See Appendix A page 37.
Note that all the results derived hold for any arbitrary symmetric probability density g with a
ﬁnite variance.25 Note also that I only need information about a single moment of the geographic
dispersion of random contacts, ∆2
0, to explain the dispersion of the contacts of all ﬁrms. For any two
distributions g and g￿ that have the same ∆2
0, the average squared distance from a ﬁrm’s contact
will evolve in the same way. This result will prove useful for guiding the empirical strategy, as I
only need to estimate the single moment, ∆2
0, and do not have to characterize the entire geographic
distribution of exports. Moreover, I show numerically in Section 1.3 that Proposition 3 holds even
if diﬀerent points in space have diﬀerent g distributions, with the same ∆2
0 on average, and if space
is not uniformly populated.
The reason why the geographic dispersion of a ﬁrm’s contacts increases with this ﬁrm’s number
of contacts comes entirely from the network based meetings. It is easy to see analytically from
Proposition 3 that if all new contacts are made at random (r → +∞), the average squared distance
∆2 (M) is constant and equal to ∆2
0. As the relative share of network-based meetings increases (r
shrinks), not only does ∆2 (M) become larger for all M’s, but ∆2 (M) increases faster with M.
The intuition for this result is the following. If all contacts are made at random, older ﬁrms
have more contacts than younger ones because they have been contacted by a larger number of
waves of entrants since their birth. However, since each new wave of entrants is independently
and identically distributed over space, the geographic distribution of a ﬁrm’s contacts remains
unchanged. It is simply given by the distribution of each wave of entrants (g with average squared
distance ∆2
0). Network-based meetings follow a diﬀerent spatial dynamic. Firms use their existing
25As noted earlier, the special case of zero variance (g = δ, the Dirac delta function) collapses exactly to the
space-less model of Jackson and Rogers.
11contacts as local hubs to acquire new contacts. This allows them to gradually expand deeper into
space. Each new wave of network-based meetings therefore allows ﬁrms to increase the geographic
dispersion of their contacts.
I will show in Section 2.3 that Proposition 3 is supported by data on ﬁrm level exports. Using
the estimate for the relative importance of random versus network-based meetings estimated from
the cross section of entry into diﬀerent markets,26 and simply calibrating the units of measure-
ment,27 I describe how the geographic dispersion of contacts increases as ﬁrms get more contacts.
1.3 Robustness
In this section, I show numerically that the predictions of the model are robust to removing the
mean-ﬁeld approximation, as well as relaxing the assumptions that the population is uniformly
distributed over space and that the same g function governs random meetings for all ﬁrms.
To do so, I randomly generate a non-uniform population distribution over a ﬁnite interval.28
The artiﬁcial world I generate features areas of various sizes (islands) separated by empty spaces
of various sizes (oceans), as well as a varying population density. A growing population of ﬁrms is
randomly allocated to these diﬀerent locations, and forms meetings with existing ﬁrms according to
the process described in Section 1.1. However, ﬁrms in diﬀerent locations face diﬀerent geographies:
some ﬁrms are close to the boundaries of this world, some are in the middle of densely populated
areas, and some are in isolated and sparsely populated islands. So ﬁrms form random meetings
according to diﬀerent g distributions, with the same dispersion ∆2
0 on average only. Finally, since
I consider a world with a discrete number of ﬁrms, I do not impose a mean-ﬁeld approximation
on the process of link formation, and actual meetings are governed in large part by luck.
In other words, using numerical simulations, I relax the mean-ﬁeld approximation, as well as
the assumptions of an unbounded, continuous and uniformly populated world. The results of these
numerical simulations is presented in Figure 1.
The numerical simulations show that the mean-ﬁeld approximation is precise,29 and that the
convenient assumptions that the world is unbounded, continuous and uniformly populated, and
that all ﬁrms face the same distribution g are not crucial for the main theoretical predictions of
26r × m is estimated from ﬁtting Proposition 2 to the data in Section 2.2.
27∆
2
0 is not a unit-free parameter.
28See Appendix A on page 39 for a precise description of the numerical simulation of the model.
29Atalay (2011) derives an analytical solution for the Jackson and Rogers (2007) model without a mean-ﬁeld
approximation, and shows analytically that this approximation is precise. He does not however consider the more
general model embedded in geographic space presented above.
12Figure 1: Numerical simulations of Proposition 2 and 3.
Notes: The simulation covers 100 periods. The solid red line in the left panel corresponds to the theoretical
prediction from Propositions 2, and in the right panel to the theoretical prediction from Proposition 3. The blue
plus signs corresponds to the results from the numerical simulation.
the model. The simulated cross-sectional distribution of the number of contacts is close to the
theoretical prediction in Proposition 2. The geographic dispersion of contacts closely matches
the theoretical prediction of Proposition 3 for most ﬁrms, but idiosyncratic noise increases as we
consider ﬁrms with very many contacts. This is mostly due to the high variance of the realizations
of the simulation among the small sample of well connected ﬁrms. This pattern of the simulated
data resembles the actual data on ﬁrm level exports presented in Section 2.3.
1.4 Discussion
Interpretation of the model: There are several alternative interpretations of the proposed
model. The most literal one is that individual ﬁrms meet other individual ﬁrms, some of them
located in foreign countries, in the way described by the model. I follow this literal interpretation
when bringing the model to the data, and I explain in detail how to circumvent the fact that I
only have data on which countries a ﬁrm exports to, and not directly on how many contacts it has
in each country.
A less literal interpretation is the following. Firms try to enter foreign markets. The entry
into the very ﬁrst foreign market can be described as random, which is a reduced form for all
the idiosyncrasies of diﬀerent ﬁrms (type of product the ﬁrm is producing and the taste for that
product in various foreign markets, speciﬁc comparative advantage of that particular ﬁrm, actual
information that workers in that ﬁrm have about various foreign markets...). However, upon
13successfully entering a given country, this ﬁrm can acquire information locally, and has the option
of expanding into other foreign markets from this given country. The quality of this information is
simply discounted compared to information acquired from the home market. The model assumes
that the discount in the quality of information is the same for all foreign markets.30 In other
words, a French exporter that has successfully entered the Japanese market can subsequently fan
out into Asia as easily as a French exporter that has successfully entered the Argentine market
can fan out into Latin America. So entry into each new market increases the chances for that
exporter to enter yet another market. The geographic dispersion of a ﬁrm’s exports increases as
it enters more markets.
Welfare analysis: Given the simplicity of the structure of the network that emerges, I can
describe the welfare implications of this model in a variety of economic settings.31 For instance, if
consumers have access to diﬀerentiated goods according to the process described above, and if they
value the diversity of the goods they consume, then aggregate welfare will increase as m increases.
Trivially, a larger m implies that all consumers have access to more goods, which unambiguously
increases welfare. On the other hand, an increase in r will reduce the inequality in the access
to goods variety across consumers. If goods are suﬃciently substitutable, then an increase in r
will increase aggregate welfare, whereas if goods are less substitutable, the welfare gains of those
consumers that have access to many goods is not enough to dominate the welfare losses of those
consumers that have access to few goods. An identical argument can be made regarding aggregate
productivity if ﬁrms, not consumers, have access to diﬀerentiated intermediate inputs according to
the process described above, and if a ﬁrm’s productivity increases with the number of diﬀerentiated
inputs it has access to.
Relation to the existing ﬁrm-level trade literature: Existing international trade models
with heterogeneous ﬁrms, such as Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003) or Melitz (2003)
and its extension in Chaney (2008) do not oﬀer speciﬁc predictions regarding the distribution of
the number of countries reached by diﬀerent ﬁrms. By comparison, the network model I develop
oﬀers a parsimonious theory for the extensive margin of international trade.
30Formally, the information gathered from foreign markets is discounted by the same factor
mn
mr(mr+mn) < 1 in
all foreign markets.
31See Appendix B.1 for a formal derivation of a model where ﬁrms access consumers, and consumers access
goods through the process described above, as well as the predictions of this model regarding welfare and the size
distribution of ﬁrms.
14In the original Melitz (2003) model, all trade barriers are symmetric, and any exporter exports
to all foreign markets. This is obviously an artifact of the counter-factual assumption that all trade
barriers are perfectly symmetric. In Chaney (2008), I oﬀer a simple extension of Melitz (2003)
with asymmetric country sizes and ﬁxed and variable trade barriers. In this model, from the point
of view of a given exporting country, say France, there is a strict hierarchy of foreign markets.
This means that markets can be strictly ordered in a decreasing level of accessibility, so that if a
French ﬁrm exports to the Mth most accessible market, it will necessarily export to all markets
M￿ ≤ M. Therefore, the fraction of ﬁrms that export to exactly M markets is simply the fraction
of ﬁrms that have a productivity between the productivity threshold for exporting to market M
and the threshold for exporting to market M +1 . Even if productivities are distributed Pareto,
the fraction of ﬁrms that export to exactly M markets can take any value, depending on the
distance between the thresholds for exporting to country M and M +1. Even if country sizes are
themselves Pareto distributed, and if ﬁxed export costs are log-proportional to country size, there
is no reason to make the counter factual assumption that variable trade barriers are themselves
log-proportional to country size. The fraction of ﬁrms that export to exactly M markets does
not even have to be decreasing in M. I develop these arguments formally in the Appendix, and
provide a calibration of the Melitz/Chaney model on the same data I use in Section 2.32
By adding to the Melitz/Chaney model ﬁrm-destination speciﬁc idiosyncratic shocks to the
entry cost and demand faced by each ﬁrm, Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2010) can a priori
replicate any pattern of entry in the data. Calibrating their model to the data, they need to assume
a very large amount of idiosyncratic noise33, so that the productivity thresholds are essentially
randomly distributed. With the assumption of this additional noise, the fraction of ﬁrms that
export to exactly M markets inherits the Pareto distribution of productivities across ﬁrms, which
matches the data well. This distribution is directly assumed, and the fact that the model lines
up with the data comes from the assumption of a large amount of idiosyncratic noise and of
Pareto distributed productivity shocks, and not from the underlying Melitz/Chaney model.34 In
contrast, the network model I develop oﬀers a theory of the distribution of entry into foreign
32See Appendix B.3 on page 47.




34Similarly, Armenter and Koren (2010) estimate from the data the distribution of the number of shipments (the
distribution of the number of “balls”) from the data, and then generate predictions for the occurrence of zeroes in
the trade data. By contrast, instead of assuming this distribution to match the data, my model oﬀers a theory that
generates such a distribution.
15contacts, without the need for ad hoc assumptions on ﬁrms’ productivity distribution.
In the stochastic model of Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003), there is no strict
hierarchy in the accessibility of foreign markets. A given exporter, even if it has a low productivity,
may still export to many foreign countries, if this exporter is lucky enough to face unproductive
foreign competitors. However, the structure of country sizes, relative productivities and labor
costs across countries, and bilateral trade barriers between countries imposes a severe restriction
on the cross-sectional distribution of the number of foreign markets entered. For a large number
of ﬁrms, or for the continuous limit developed in the model, there is no uncertainty either in the
fraction of ﬁrms entering any given market, or the distribution of the number of markets entered.
This distribution depends on the speciﬁc trade barriers and country characteristics. Even with
the assumed ad hoc and convenient Fréchet distribution of productivities, there is no reason why
any particular distribution should arise. As in the Melitz model, the fraction of ﬁrms that export
to exactly M markets does not even have to be decreasing in M. The following argument makes
this point clear. In the limit of inﬁnitely large trade barriers, all ﬁrms only sell in their domestic
market, so that no ﬁrm sells to any M>0 foreign markets. In the other extreme of perfectly
free trade, all ﬁrms that sell domestically also export to all countries in the world. So whereas
the fraction of ﬁrms that export to all foreign countries in the world is monotonically decreasing
from 1 to 0 with the level of trade barriers, the fraction of ﬁrms exporting to any other number of
foreign countries is not monotone. The fraction of ﬁrms exporting to exactly M markets can be
made arbitrarily small or large by simply varying bilateral trade barriers.
Finally, if trade barriers increase with distance, and if there is no systematic correlation between
country size and distance from France, both the Melitz/Chaney model and Bernard, Eaton, Jensen
and Kortum (2003) would correctly predict that the geographic dispersion of foreign markets
increases with the number of markets a ﬁrm enters. However, neither model oﬀers any speciﬁc
prediction for the shape of this relationship. Even if a large amount of noise is added as in Eaton,
Kortum and Kramarz (2010), the very strong tendency of ﬁrms in the Melitz/Chaney model to
ﬁrst enter close by markets implies that exports are far more geographically concentrated than in
the data. For instance, among ﬁrms that export to a single foreign market, the average squared
distance (in thousands of km) between France and that country is 18 in the data, 16 in my
calibrated model, but only 2 in the calibrated Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2010) model.3536
35For a more intuitive interpretation of these numbers, the average distance is 3,500 km in the data versus 900
km in the calibrated Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2010) model.
36Of course, as in the Melitz/Chaney model, as ﬁrms eventually enter all countries, the diﬀerence between the
16To summarize, while existing ﬁrm level trade models directly make ad hoc assumptions to
match the extensive margin of trade, I develop a parsimonious model that endogenizes these
assumptions. On the other hand, my model is silent about the determinants of the intensive
margin of trade, or about the relation between a ﬁrm’s exposure to international trade and its size
in diﬀerent markets, while those models make precise predictions about those. I that sense, the
proposed network model is complementary to the existing ﬁrm level trade literature.
I have developed in this section a parsimonious model of the formation of an international
network of importers and exporters. I use this model to describe the patterns of entry of exporters
into diﬀerent foreign markets. This model delivers a series of empirically testable predictions.
First, the model predicts that a stable cross sectional distribution of the the number of countries a
ﬁrm exports to should arise. The shape of this distribution only depends on the relative importance
of random versus network-based meetings. Second, the model predicts that as ﬁrms enter more
foreign markets, the geographic dispersion of their exports should increase. Third, the model
delivers predictions for the dynamics of both ﬁrm level and aggregate trade. I empirically test
those predictions in the next section.
2 Empirical evidence
In this section, I bring several the key testable predictions from the theoretical model to the data.
In Section 2.1, I describe the data on ﬁrm level exports for French ﬁrms, as well as aggregate
bilateral trade ﬂows for the rest of the world. In Section 2.2, I test the ﬁrst main prediction of
the model regarding the cross-sectional distribution of entry into diﬀerent foreign markets, derived
from Proposition 2. In Section 2.3, I test the second main prediction of the model regarding the
geographic dispersion of exports across ﬁrms, derived from Proposition 3. In Section 2.4, I test
some of the assumptions of the model on the dynamics of exports at the ﬁrm and aggregate level.
In doing so, I link formally the time-series and the cross-section of ﬁrm level exports.
data and the model shrinks. Among ﬁrms that export to the maximum observed number of countries (98), the
average squared distance is 38 in the data, 43 in my calibrated model, versus 36 in the Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz
(2010) model. Those numbers however are less precisely estimated, as few ﬁrms export to that many markets.
172.1 Data
To bring the model to the data, I use two sources of data.37 First, I use ﬁrm level export data
for French exporters, over the period 1986-1992. The data used come from the same source as
the data used by Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2010). For the purpose of this paper, I will only
use information on French exporters in the years 1986 to 1992, not information on domestic sales
within France. For each ﬁrm, I know the total value (in French Francs) of its exports over a given
year, to a given country. There are between 119,000 exporters (in 1988) and 130,000 exporters
(in 1987) in my sample. Those ﬁrms export to a total of 210 diﬀerent foreign countries. French
exporters export on average to between 3.8 (in 1991) and 4.2 (in 1986) diﬀerent foreign markets.
In addition to these data on ﬁrm level exports for France, I use information on the size of
countries, their distance from France and from one another, and aggregate bilateral trade between
country pairs. The size of a country is measured as nominal GDP, collected from the Penn
World Tables.38 The distance between two countries is the population weighted geodesic distances
between the main cities in both countries, which come from the CEPII.39 Finally, I use data on
aggregate bilateral trade ﬂows between countries, which are collected from the NBER.40
2.2 Matching the distribution of export destinations
In this section, I test the ﬁrst main prediction of the model, Proposition 2. The model predicts
that the out-degree is the same for all ﬁrms, and that the in-degree distribution of a given ﬁrm
can be described by a mixture of an exponential and a Pareto distribution, where the only two
parameters governing this distribution are r, the ratio of random to network-based links initiated
by new ﬁrms, and m, the total number of links initiated by new ﬁrms.
There is one main complication that arises when bringing this prediction to the data: the data
on ﬁrm level exports only provide information on the number of countries a ﬁrm exports to, not
the number of individual foreign ﬁrms it exports to. To circumvent this problem, I will use a
simple statistical correction, following the guidance of the theoretical model. The model predicts
the cross sectional distribution of the number of foreign contacts. Assuming that those contacts
randomly fall into foreign countries, the model also predicts the cross sectional distribution of the
37See Appendix C.1 for a detailed description of the data.
38See the description of the data in http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/.
39See the description of the data in http://www.cepii.fr/distance/noticedist_en.pdf.
40See the description of the data in Feenstra et al. (2004).
18number of distinct foreign markets reached by French exporters. For the parameters estimated
from the data, I ﬁnd for instance that ﬁrms that export to a single foreign market have on average
1.002 foreign contacts (with a standard deviation of .0476), while ﬁrms that export to 162,t h e
maximum observed in the data, have on average 303 foreign contacts (with a s.d. of 19.5). This
predicted distribution of the number of foreign markets reached only depends on the parameters of
the model, r, the ratio of random to network-based meetings, and m, the total number of meetings
initiated by new ﬁrms, as well as the total number of foreign countries in the data, 210.41
The estimation of the parameters (r,m) is as follows. For any combination of those param-
eters, assuming that each French ﬁrm independently draws a number of foreign contacts from
the distribution F (M) in Proposition 2, and assuming that these contacts randomly fall into 210
distinct foreign countries, there is a certain likelihood of observing a given cross sectional distribu-
tion of the number of foreign countries reached by French exporters. I estimate through Maximum
Likelihood the parameters (r,m) that match the data best.
The results are presented in column (1) of Table 1. The empirical cross sectional distribution
of entry into diﬀerent foreign markets by French exporters suggests that among French exporters,
approximately 60% of their foreign contacts are met at random, while 40% are met through
network-based meetings. Newborn ﬁrms form approximately mr =2 .4 contacts at random versus
mn =1 .4 network-based contacts.42 Figure 2 plots the empirical density of the number of foreign
markets served by French exporters and the theoretical prediction. The fact that both random
and network-based meetings coexist explains the curvature of the empirical density in a log-log
scale.
For robustness, I also estimate the parameters (r,m) through various alternative speciﬁcations.
The parameter estimates vary little across the various speciﬁcations or estimation methods. In
column (2) of Table 1, I estimate the parameters through Maximum Likelihood under the simpli-
fying assumption that a ﬁrm that exports to exactly M distinct foreign countries has exactly M
diﬀerent foreign contacts. In column (3), I estimate through a Non Linear Least Square proce-
dure the parameters under the same simplifying assumption that one country corresponds to one
contact.43 Finally, in column (4), I estimate through Maximum Likelihood a simpler benchmark
41See Appendix C.2 on page 56 for a formal derivation of the distribution of the number of distinct countries





2.65 ≈ 1.4; mr = m − mn ≈ 3.8 − 1.4 ≈ 2.4.
43Speciﬁcally, I estimate through NLLS the parameters (α,r,m) in the following equation,
ln(fraction of ﬁrms exporting to M countries)=α − (2 + r)ln(M + r × m)+￿
19Table 1: Empirical ﬁt of Proposition2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(MLE w. correction) (MLE) (NLLS) (MLE)
r 1.65 1.82 1.58 +∞
(.022) (.025) (.14)
m 3.83 3.71 4.86 3.84
(.019) (.017) (.44) (.011)
Adj. R2/log(lik.) -282,098 -282,022 0.98 -296,916
lik. ratio test: (4) vs. (2) Λ = 29,788,p - v a l u e<. 0001
Notes: This table presents the estimates of parameters r and m using diﬀerent procedures. These two parameters
govern the distribution of the number of foreign contacts, F (M),i nP r o p o s i t i o n2 .Iu s et h es a m ed a t ao nF r e n c h
exporters in 1992 for all procedures. Standard errors are in parentheses. All coeﬃcients are statistically diﬀerent
from zero at the 1% level of signiﬁcance.
model where contacts are only acquired at random, again under the same simplifying assumption
that one country corresponds to one contact. I propose a likelihood-ratio test of my model against
this simpler benchmark, and reject the simpler model unambiguously. I oﬀer further robustness
checks in the Appendix.44
The fact that the estimated parameters vary little across the diﬀerent speciﬁcations is not
surprising. Eaton, Eslava, Krizan, Kugler and Tybout (2010) are able to identify separately
each U.S. contact of Colombian exporter. They show that 80% of Colombian ﬁrms that export
to the U.S. have a single contact (buyer) there. In the context of within country trade, using
detailed information on the input-output linkages between individual US ﬁrms, Atalay, Hortaçsu,
Roberts and Syverson (2010) report that the average number of U.S. suppliers of U.S. ﬁrms is only
marginally above 1. Assuming that ﬁrms have exactly one single contact per market seems to be
ag o o da p p r o x i m a t i o no ft h ed a t a .
Armed with an estimate for the relative importance of random versus network-based meetings,
I study the geographic dispersion of exports across ﬁrms in the next section.
where ￿ is a normally distributed error term. This corresponds to the log-linearization of Proposition 2.
44See Table 4 on page 60 in Appendix C.3.
20Figure 2: Empirical ﬁt of Proposition 2,f (M) versus M.
Notes: f (M) is the fraction of ﬁrms exporting to M destinations; dots: data, all French exporters in 1992; line:
theory. r =1 .65 (.022) and m =3 .83 (.019) are estimated through Maximum Likelihood.
2.3 Matching the geographic dispersion of exports
In this section, I test the second main prediction of the model, Proposition 3. The model predicts
the speciﬁc way in which the geographic dispersion of exports increases as ﬁrms enter more foreign
markets. This relationship only depends on the relative importance of random versus network-
based meetings.
Using data on the geographic distribution of exports among ﬁrms exporting to exactly M for-
eign markets, I construct an empirical measure of the geographic dispersion of exports, ∆2 (M).45
As a reminder, the theory predicts the following relationship between the geographic dispersion of















Using the cross sectional distribution of the number of export destinations across ﬁrms, I estimated
in the previous section that r × m ≈ 6.32. I only need to calibrate ∆2
0, which is not a unit-free
45Id e s c r i b ea n dd i s c u s si ng r e a td e t a i l st h i se m p i r i c a lm e a s u r ei nA p p e n d i xC . 2o np a g e5 6 .
21Figure 3: Empirical ﬁt of Proposition 3, ∆2 (M) versus M.
Notes: ∆
2 (M) is the average squared distance to a ﬁrm’s export destinations, among ﬁrms exporting to M
destinations; dots: data, all French exporters in 1992; line: theory. r × m =6 .32 is taken from the estimation
of Proposition 2, and ∆
2
0=14.860 (.109) is estimated through non linear least squares, each point weighted by the
square root of the number of observations used to compute ∆
2 (M).
measure, to bring the theoretical prediction to the data.46 I use a non linear least square estimation
of the previous equation, and recover ∆2
0 ≈ 14.860 (.109),w i t ha nR2 of 87%.47
Figure 3 plots the geographic dispersion of exports, ∆2 (M), as a function of the total number
of foreign countries entered, both in the data and in the theory. Note that I only calibrate the
intercept of this relationship. I have no other degrees of freedom that would allow me to calibrate
the shape of this relationship. This shape is entirely governed by the theoretical prediction, and
by the value for r ×m, estimated in the previous section on the cross-sectional distribution of the
number of foreign destinations.
46As discussed in Section 1.4, I do not need to rely on any speciﬁc assumption on the shape of the distribution
g, except for symmetry and ﬁnite variance. The evolution of the geographic dispersion of exports, ∆
2 (M),a sa
function of Monly depends on the single moment ∆
2
0,w h i c h e v e rt h es h a p eo fd i s t r i b u t i o ng is. The multiplication
by ∆
2
0 is only needed to match the initial conditions and to scale the units, as ∆
2 (M) is not a unit-free measure.
47Each observation is weighted by the precision of its estimation. This precision is given by the square root of
the number of observations used to estimate each second moment. See Appendix C.3 on page 59 for a series of
robustness checks using diﬀerent years and diﬀerent empirical measures of ∆
2 (M).
22The theory connects two distinct empirical observations. First, few ﬁrms are able to export
to many markets. The proposed explanation is that few ﬁrms are able to acquire a large network
of contacts. The exact shape of the distribution of the number of foreign contacts is governed by
the process of network formation. Second, as ﬁrms enter more foreign markets, the geographic
dispersion of their exports increases. The proposed explanation is that through network-based
contacts, exporters are able to reach deeper and deeper into geographic space. They use their
faraway contacts as remote hubs to access even more distant markets. Tthe exact shape of the
relationship between geographic dispersion and the number of export destinations is governed by
the process of network formation. The evidence presented in this and the previous section connects
these two observations, giving support to the theory.
The next section directly tests some of the underlying assumptions of the model regarding the
dynamic process of network formation.
2.4 Matching trade dynamics
In this section, I directly test in a reduced form some of the main predictions of the theoretical
model regarding the time-series of entry of individual ﬁrms into foreign markets.
First, ﬁrms with more foreign contacts are more likely to enter an additional market.
Second, a ﬁrm beneﬁts from the contacts of its contacts. In other words, if a ﬁrm i has a
contact in country c￿ which itself has a contact in country c, then ﬁrm i is more likely to enter
country c, everything else being equal. I do not have any direct information on the contacts of
the contacts of French exporters. I will instead use data on aggregate trade ﬂows between third
countries as a proxy for the intensity of communication between those countries. The prediction
that I test is that if ﬁrm i exports to country c￿ at time t−1, and if aggregate exports from country
c￿ to c increase from t − 1 to t, then ﬁrm i is more likely to enter country c at time t, everything
else being equal. I implicitly assume that if aggregate exports from c￿ to c increase, some ﬁrms in
c￿ acquire new contacts in c.
Third, a ﬁrm beneﬁts from the location of its existing contacts. In other words, despite the
fact that distance hinders the acquisition of foreign contacts, a ﬁrm can use its network of contacts
to acquire new contacts in the vicinity of its existing contacts. In that sense, the relevant distance
that hampers the acquisition of contacts in country c is not only the distance between France and
country c, but also the distance from all the countries c￿ where a ﬁrm has existing contacts and
country c.
23I test all three predictions using a Probit regression of diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the following
equation,
















lnDistc￿,c + γ2 × lnDistFr,c+ γ3 ×
1




+ δ × I{exporti,c,t−1 > 0} + Controlsc,t + ￿i,c,t (2)
where I{exporti,c,t > 0} is an indicator function equal to 1 if ﬁrm i exports to country c in
year t, {N. contactsi,t−1} is the total number of foreign markets ﬁrm i exports to in year t − 1,
∆Exportsc￿,c,t
Exportsc￿,c,t−1 is the growth of aggregate exports from c￿ to c between year t − 1 and t, lnDistc,c￿
is the natural logarithm of the geographic distance between country c and c￿,a n dCi,t−1 is





the growth of aggregate imports by country c from all countries where ﬁrm i exports at time
t−1,a n d 1
|Ci,t−1|
￿




Exportsc￿,c,t−1 is the growth of aggregate imports by country c from all countries in the
world (excluding France), and 1
|{c￿:c￿￿=Fr}|
￿
c￿￿=FrlnDistc￿,c is the average distance between c and
all countries in the world (excluding France). ￿i,c,t is a normally distributed error term.
The model predicts that ﬁrms with more existing contacts are more likely acquire new contacts.
I expect, α>0.
The model predicts that ﬁrms beneﬁt from the contacts of their contacts. I expect that β1 > 0.
Note that it is possible that some fast growing country c may see an increase in its imports from
the entire world, including France. This would increase the likelihood that any ﬁrm enters country
c, irrespective of its network of existing contacts. I control for such a direct eﬀect by using
information on aggregate imports of country c, and expect β2 > 0.
The model predicts that ﬁrms beneﬁt from the location of their contacts. I expect γ1 < 0.A t
the same time, distance impedes link formation directly, so that I expect γ2 < 0.N o t et h a ti ti s
possible that if country c is more isolated from the rest of the world, in the sense that it is more
distant from all other countries, competition in c will be relatively mild, and it will therefore be
easier to access c. I control for such a direct eﬀect by using information on the location of country






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































26Table 2 shows the results of the Probit estimation of diﬀerent speciﬁcations of Equation (2),
and Table 3 shows the marginal eﬀects of these regressions. In every speciﬁcation, all coeﬃcients
are statistically signiﬁcant (at the 1% conﬁdence level), and of the expected signs.
More interestingly, the estimates from this panel regression are quantitatively close to the
predictions of the model calibrated on the cross-sectional distribution of the number of contacts
only. From the results in column (1), the estimated increment in the probability of exporting to
a given country due to adding an extra contact is .46%. Using the estimate for r × m from the
estimation of the distribution of the number of foreign contacts across ﬁrms in Section 2.2, I would
predict that this increment is also equal to .46%.48
The interpretation of the coeﬃcient on the growth of imports from countries where a ﬁrm was
already exporting is less obvious. Given that I do not have any direct data on the foreign contacts
of French exporters, I can only infer that if aggregate trade increases between two countries, new
contacts must have been created between those countries. However, even with this caveat in mind,
the results are both qualitatively and quantitatively in line with the theory. Using the results in
column (6), the estimated increment in the probability of entering a given foreign country following
an increase in this country’s imports is positive, and roughly 57% larger than the increment coming
from an increase in the imports from the countries where a ﬁrm is actually exporting. A very
rough interpretation of this result suggests that random meetings are approximately 57% larger
than network-based meetings, or that r = mr
mn ≈ .0022
.0014 ≈ 1.57. This is close to r ≈ 1.65 estimated
from the cross-sectional distribution of the number of foreign contacts across ﬁrms in Section 2.2.
To conﬁrm the results above, I run a series of robustness checks in the Appendix.49 For
instance, using various lags of exports, I show that the data would not be consistent with a model
where exporters enter countries in which they have acquired a distribution network, or sell to
consumers that have a particular taste for their good, and where either the cost of a distribution
network or tastes are spatially correlated.
Taking the speciﬁc functional form of the model even more seriously, I can structurally estimate






.S o a d d i n g o n e c o n t a c t










r×m.T h e a v e r a g e p r o b -
ability of entering a new country in the sample is 4.7%,t h ea v e r a g en u m b e ro fc o n t a c t si nt h es a m p l ei s3 . 9 ,a n d
r × m ≈ 6.32 from estimating Proposition 2 on the cross-sectional distribution of the number of foreign contacts.
I predict that the increment in the probability of entering a new country stemming from moving from 3.9 to 4.9





49See Appendix C.3 and the results in Table 6 on page 63 for a series of robustness checks on the time-series of
ﬁrm level exports.
27the law of motion for the number of contacts implied by Equation (1). Integrating the in-degree
distribution fτ over R, I get the following law of motion for Mτ, the number of foreign contacts
of a ﬁrm of age τ,




Adding a series of controls, including on the growth rate of domestic sales of those ﬁrms to control
for the growth trajectory a ﬁrm follows, does not aﬀect those results substantially. A simple OLS
estimation of the relationship above gives ￿ γ
1+r = .165 (.00040) and ￿ γmr = .876 (.0048). This
implies r×m ≈ 5.5, which is close to r×m ≈ 6.32 estimated from the cross-sectional distribution
of the number of foreign contacts across ﬁrms in Section 2.2.50
I have presented in this section direct evidence in support of the assumptions of the proposed
theoretical model based on the time-series dimension of ﬁrm level French exports. This evidence is
consistent with the cross-sectional evidence presented earlier. The theoretical model ties together
qualitatively and quantitatively the cross-sectional and time-series of ﬁrm-level exports.
Conclusion
I have developed a theoretical model of the dynamic formation of an international network of
importers and exporters. Firms can only export in countries where they have a contact. I assume
that ﬁrms acquire contacts either at random, or via their existing network of contacts. This
dynamic model generates a stable network structure. The model makes precise predictions about
the cross-sectional distribution of the number of foreign contacts, the cross-sectional distribution
of the geographic dispersion of foreign contacts, and the dynamics of entry of individual ﬁrms
into foreign markets. All theoretical predictions are supported by the data on ﬁrm level exports
from France. Firms acquire about 60% more contacts at random than they do via network-based
meetings.
This model and the empirical ﬁndings that support it suggest several extensions and general-
izations. First, the emergence of a stable distribution of entrants into diﬀerent foreign markets,
and the fact that ﬁrms that export to more countries are less aﬀected by geographic distance, may
generate aggregate trade ﬂows that follow the so called gravity equations. This may provide an
50Depending on the speciﬁcations, the time-series estimate of r×m ranges between 2 (without any controls) and
5.68. See Appendix C.3 and the results in Table 8 on page 66 for a series of robustness checks on this structural
time-series estimation.
28explanation for the stable role that geographic distance plays in explaining bilateral trade ﬂows.
Second, I have only studied a simple symmetric case, and described its steady state properties. A
large shock to this dynamic system would generate non trivial transitional dynamics. For example,
a large disruption of trade linkages, or the rapid growth of a large country may have a long lasting
impact on the world geography of trade, since (re)building contacts is a lengthy process. Third,
whereas I have only sketched the welfare implications of a simple economic model that would
support the proposed dynamics, the structure of the network lends itself to further analysis of the
welfare gains from trade. Jackson and Rogers (2007) propose tools to analyze the welfare impli-
cations of diﬀerent network structures, and the model developed in this paper adds a geographic
dimension to their space-less model. The robust predictions of the model regarding the geographic
distribution of exports may allow for precise statements on the welfare gains from trade. I leave
these questions for future research.
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31Technical Appendix for:
The Network Structure of International Trade
by Thomas Chaney, University of Chicago
A Mathematical proofs and numerical simulations
A.1 Mathematical proofs
In this section, I give the detailed mathematical proofs of the various propositions, lemmas and
claims that I have presented in Section 1.













where δ is the Dirac delta function, ∗ is the convolution product,51 γ is the growth rate of the
population, g is the geographic distribution of random contacts for newborn ﬁrms, and mr and mn
are respectively the number of random and network-based meetings of newly born ﬁrms.
fτ admits closed form solutions in the special cases where g is a Gaussian, Laplace, or Cauchy
distribution.
Proof. Taking a Fourier transform of Eq. (1), and using the convolution theorem which
states that the Fourier transform of the convolution of distributions is the product of the Fourier




F [g] ×F[fτ]+F [fτ]









for τ>0, with the initial condition at τ =0 ,
F [f0]=M0F [g]
51The exponent ∗τ stands for a distribution convoluted with itself τ times.


















Taking the inverse Fourier transform of this equation, and noting that F−1 [1] = δ, where δ is the


















Taking M0 =0 , I get the proposed expression for fτ.
Note two interesting special cases where fτ admits a closed form solution, the Normal and
the Cauchy distributions. These distributions are such that the sum of two normally (Cauchy)


































































Normal distribution: using the fact that if g = φσ2 where φσ2 is the p.d.f. of Normal
















Cauchy distribution: using the fact that if g = ψγ where ψγ is the p.d.f. of Cauchy
















Note that in the special case where distance represents an insurmountable barrier to the for-
mation of trade linkages, which corresponds formally the case g = δ, the model collapses to the
space-less model of Jackson and Rogers (2007) where each location is an isolated island that
behaves exactly like in Jackson and Rogers,































where γ is the growth rate of the population, and mr and mn are respectively the number of random
and network-based meetings of newly born ﬁrms.

























(mr + mn)δ (x)
￿
dx
Using the known result that the integral of a convolution of distributions is the product of the






























Since both the Dirac δ function and g are well deﬁned probability density functions, so that
´
R δ (x)dx =
´

















Taking M0 =0 , I get the proposed expression for Mτ.
Proposition 2 (reminded) For a population growth rate γ small, the distribution of the number





M + r × m
￿1+r
where r = mr/mn is the ratio of random versus network based meetings, and m =( mr + mn) is
the total number of contacts made by newly born ﬁrms.
34Proof. At any time, in any give location, and therefore in the union of any given set of
locations, the fraction of ﬁrms with more than M contacts is simply the fraction of ﬁrms older
than τ (M), deﬁned as Mτ(M) = M. Using the expression for the number of contacts of a ﬁrm of
age τ from Lemma 1, and leaving aside considerations of integer constraints (τ only takes integer
















⇒ τ (M)=l n
￿
M0 + mr
mn (mr + mn)
M + mr








Given the exponential growth of the population, the fraction of ﬁrms older than τ (M) is given at











mn (mr + mn)
M + mr















and given that the fraction of ﬁrms older than τ (M) is the counter-cumulative distribution of in-
degrees,
Nt−τ(M)
Nt =1−Ft (M), I get the proposed cumulative distribution function for the number




mn (mr + mn)
M + mr
mn (mr + mn)
￿1+mr/mn
Taking M0 =0 , I get the proposed expression for F (M).53
52Note that I am not making any continuous approximation of the discrete model. The proposed formulas are
exactly correct when τ is an integer. Those formulas simply extrapolate to non integer values for τ.B e i n gav e r y
serious person, I never use these extrapolations.
53Note that formally, the c.d.f. of the in-degree distribution within the population is a step function that
corresponds to the true discrete distribution. However, the values of F (M) for the M’s corresponding to the
discrete ages among the population at any point in time are given by the exact formula for F (M) above. If there
were an initial period t =0for history, whereas the function F (M) is time invariant, the location of the steps
for the M’s would evolve through time. All the formulas above hold exactly at any point in time, without any
continuous approximation.
35Note the following polar cases, when mr/mn → +∞ or mr/mn → 0. Given the above expres-








so that the in-degree distribution converges to an exponential distribution when almost all contacts






so that the in-degree distribution converges to a Zipf’s law when almost all contacts are network-
based. Alternatively, it would have been easy to solve for F (M) in both polar cases using Propo-
sition 1 directly.
Lemma 2 The geographic dispersion of a ﬁrm’s contacts increases as a ﬁrm ages. Formally, ∆2
τ,















mn (mr + mn)+M0
￿
− mr














where γ is the growth rate of the population, r = mr/mn is the ratio of random versus network-
based meetings, and ∆2
0 ≡
´
R x2g (x)dx is the average squared distance of random contacts.
Proof. Plugging the expression for the in-degree distribution from Proposition 1 into the






















(mr + mn)δ (x)
￿
dx
Rearranging to get a convolution of well deﬁned probability density functions (each summing up

























mn (mr + mn)δ (x)+M0g (x)
mr













(mr + mn)δ (x)dx
36Noting the fact that the Dirac delta function has zero variance, I get the following intermediate
result, ˆ
R
x2 (Aδ (x)+Bg(x))dx = B∆2
0 for any (A,B) ∈ R2

















mn (mr + mn)δ (x)+M0g (x)
mr












(mr + mn)δ (x)dx =0
Next, I use the fact that if two independent random variables X and Y have respective p.d.f.’s
f and g,t h e nX + Y has a p.d.f. equal to the convolution f ∗ g.O b v i o u s l y , i f X and Y are
independent, the variance of X + Y is equal to the sum of the variances of X and Y . This allows
























Plugging in the expression for the total number of contacts of a ﬁrm from Lemma 1, I get the
















mn (mr + mn)+M0
￿
− mr














Proposition 3 (reminded) The geographic dispersion of a ﬁrm’s contacts increases with the
ﬁrm’s number of contacts. For a population growth rate γ small, the average squared distance


















R x2g (x)dx is the average squared distance of random contacts, r = mr/mn is the
ratio of random versus network based meetings, and m =( mr + mn) is the total number of contacts
made by newly born ﬁrms.




mn (mr + mn)
M0 + mr








From Lemma 2, and plugging in the expression in Lemma 1 for the number of contacts of a ﬁrm,



















This expression deﬁnes and implicit relationship between ∆2 and M. Plugging the expression for
τ into the previous expression, I can solve for this implicit relation. I get the following expression
for ∆2 as a function of M,
∆2 (M)=
M + mr
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M0 + mr



















mn (mr + mn)
M0 + mr









Taking M0 =0 , I get the proposed expression for ∆2 (M).














Proof. Consider a newborn ﬁrm located in the origin. This ﬁrm forms mr contacts at random,
distributed over R according to the p.d.f. g. These contacts therefore follow the distribution mrg.
This ﬁrm then forms mn network-based contacts with the contacts met at random. The contacts
met at random by that ﬁrm have themselves met a fraction mr
mr+mn of their own contacts at
random, distributed according to g. These network-based contacts therefore follow the distribution
mn
mr
mr+mng ∗ g = mr
mn
mr+mng∗2... etc. Using simple algebra and Fourier transforms, I get the
proposed formula.
38A.2 Numerical simulations
In this section, I describe the procedure used to generate the numerical simulation presented in
Section 1.3.
First, I generate artiﬁcially a ﬁnite and non uniformly populated world.
The world is a segment with coordinates from -300 to +300. Locations, or “cities”, are located
two grid points apart. The density of population in each location x is proportional to the number
d(x), generated in the following way:
• I start with d(0) = 1 at the center of the world.
• Going from one grid point x to the grid point x+1directly to the East, I set d(x+1) = d(x)
with probability .9.
• With probability .1, I set d(x + 1) as the realization of a Poisson(1) random variable.
• I use the same procedure to build the world West of the origin.
• Once the whole world is populated, I randomly add or substract population until the average
of the d(x)’s is equal to 1.
Figure 4 shows the realization of one such procedure. As can be seen, this artiﬁcial world is made
of “islands”, or “continents” of diﬀerent sizes, separated by empty spaces, “oceans”. Moreover, in
each “islands”, there are densely populated cities as well as sparsely populated ones.
Second, I allocate ﬁrms to the diﬀerent locations according to the following procedure. In year
1, there are 12 × d(x) newborn ﬁrms in each location x. Population then grows in each location
at a constant growth rate of 5% per year, for 100 years. Each period, I round up the number of
newborn ﬁrms in each location to the nearest integer.
Third, ﬁrms form directed links with each other, according to the process described in Section
1.1. To circumvent integer constraints, I use the following procedure. Each year, 5 out of every 12
newborn ﬁrms in each location form 3 links with existing ﬁrms at random, and 2 network-based
links; the remaining 7 out of every 12 newborn ﬁrms forms 2 links at random, and 1 network-
based link. This procedure an average mr =2 .4167 and mn =1 .4167, which corresponds to
(m,r) ≈ (3.83,1.71) which is close to (m,r) ≈ (3.83,1.65) estimated in the data. Finally, I
assume that g ∼ N (0,16). From this Normal distribution, the probability that a given random
link is formed in one particular location is given by the mass of the Normal distribution on that
39Figure 4: A non-uniform artiﬁcial world.
grid point multiplied by the population density d(x) in that location. To compensate for the
truncation of the upper and lower tails, all probabilities are scaled by a constant to ensure they
sum up to one.
I also simulate the model relaxing only the mean-ﬁeld approximation, and the assumption of a
continuous unbounded world, but keeping the assumption that the world is uniformly populated.
Figure 5 shows that the theoretical predictions of Proposition 2 and 3 are even more precise when
the world population is uniformly distributed over space. In unreported simulations, I show that
the precision of those propositions is unaﬀected by changes in the underlying g distribution.54
54I simulate the model using for the g distribution various Normal distributions with diﬀerent variances, as well
as Laplace distributions with diﬀerent variances. Changing the variance of the g distribution or the fatness of its
tails does not aﬀect the results substantially.
40Figure 5: Numerical simulations of Proposition 2 and 3, uniform world.
Notes: The simulation covers 100 periods. The solid red line in the left panel corresponds to the theoretical
prediction from Propositions 2, and in the right panel to the theoretical prediction from Proposition 3. The blue
plus signs corresponds to the results from the numerical simulation.
B Additional economic assumptions and discussions
B.1 A model of trade with informational barriers
In this section, I embed a simple Krugman (1980) model of trade into the model of network
formation described in Section 1. The only assumption added to the Krugman model is that ﬁrms
can only sell their output to a consumer they have met through the directed network described
above. In the next section, I propose a simple model with informational asymmetries and moral
hazard that would justify such a selective trading strategy.
Preferences: There is a continuum of consumers in each country, that share the same CES
preferences, but diﬀer in the set of goods they have access to. Consumer i has the following









where the elasticity of substitution, σ, is larger than 1.
Technology: There is a continuum of monopolistic ﬁrms that face the same increasing returns
technology. The labor required to produce q units is
l(q)=α + βq
Informational frictions: The only departure from the classical Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman set-up
is that ﬁrms can only sell their output to consumers they know (through the network described
41above), and consumers can only buy from ﬁrms they know (through the same network). More
precisely, each consumer has access to a masss M,o fg o o d s( Mi =
´
Ωi dω for consumer i), with M
distributed within the population according to the distribution F (M). In the same way, each ﬁrm
has access to a mass, M, of consumers, again with M distributed within the population according
to the distribution F (M). For simplicity, I assume that there are no additional barriers to trade,
in the form of either a ﬁxed or a variable trade cost.
Prices, quantities and utilities: Given that each consumer has access to a continuum of diﬀer-
entiated goods (only the measure of those goods varies across consumers), their demand for each
good is iso-elastic.55 Facing an iso-elastic demand function, each ﬁrm charges a constant mark-up
over marginal cost, pi (ω)=p = σ
σ−1βw for any (i,ω), where w is the wage rate, which I normalize
to 1. Without loss of generality, I can also normalize β = σ−1
σ so that p =1 .
Facing those prices, if consumer i has access to Mi goods, she will buy qi =1 /Mi units of each
good ω ∈ Ωi. The welfare of this consumer is then simply Ui = U (Mi)=1 /M
1
1−σ




is the ideal price index that this consumer faces.
General equilibrium: Imposing free entry of ﬁrms in each location will pin down the number of
ﬁrms. This is left as an exercise. Alternatively, I can assume that ﬁrms are born from the process
described above, and that aggregate proﬁts are redistributed lump sum to the consumers who
collectively own all the ﬁrms in the economy. Alternatively, breaking the symmetry between all
locations, one would have to impose trade balance between locations in order to solve for relative
wages.
Aggregate welfare: Given the simple structure of the economy, I can perform a series of com-
parative statics experiments. First, I will describe the aggregate welfare of this economy, or







Jackson and Rogers (2007) derive a series of properties of the distribution F (M), which allow me
to describe the impact of changing the technological parameters of the network formation (m,r)
on aggregate welfare.
55In a model with a ﬁnite discrete number of goods, the price elasticity of demand would depend on the number of
accessible goods, asymptoting to the constant elasticity case only for a large number of goods. Having a continuum
of goods for each consumer assumes away this complication.
42Proposition 5 Aggregate welfare increases with the total number of links made by newborn ﬁrms,
m.
Proof. For r ﬁxed, if m>m ￿, then the in-degree distribution F associated with m ﬁrst order
stochastically dominates the distribution F￿ associated with m￿ (see Jackson and Rogers (2007),
Theorem 7 page 905). Since the utility associated with having access to a mass M of goods, M
1
σ−1,
is increasing in M, the aggregate welfare EF [U] associated with m is higher than the aggregate
welfare EF￿ [U] associated with m￿.
Proposition 6 If goods are suﬃciently substitutable, σ>2,t h e na g g r e g a t ew e l f a r ei n c r e a s e sw i t h
the ratio of random to network-based meetings, r.O t h e r w i s e , f o r 1 <σ<2,a g g r e g a t ew e l f a r e
decreases with r.
Proof. For m ﬁxed, if r>r ￿, then the in-degree distribution F associated with r second order
stochastically dominates the distribution F￿ associated with r￿ (see Jackson and Rogers (2007),
Theorem 6 page 903). If σ>2, the utility associated with having access to a mass M of goods,
M
1
σ−1, is concave in M. The aggregate welfare EF [U] associated with r is therefore higher than
the aggregate welfare EF￿ [U] associated with r￿.I f σ<2, the utility is convex in M,a n dt h e
opposite holds.
The intuition for those results is rather simple. First, increasing the number of links formed by
newly born ﬁrms, m, increases the number of goods accessible to all consumers. Since consumers
in this simple model have a love for variety, more links will unambiguously increase welfare for all
consumers.
Second, increasing the ratio of random to network-based meetings decreases the dispersion of
the number of contacts across consumers. As explained in the main body of the text, network-
based meetings give an advantage to agents who already have many contacts, which makes the
access to new contacts more unequal. If goods are suﬃciently substitutable, increasing the number
of contacts brings about a smaller and smaller welfare gain. As a consequence, aggregate utility is
higher for a less “unequal” network. On the other hand, if goods are less substitutable, increasing
the number of contacts brings about a larger and larger welfare gain. In that case, aggregate
utility will be higher for a more “unequal” network, where the welfare gain of the very connected
agents dominates the welfare loss of the less connected agents.
43Sales distribution: I can derive similar predictions for the distribution of sales across ﬁrms, as
well as for aggregate production.
Firms diﬀer in the mass of consumers they have access to, M. Moreover, each of their consumers
themselves diﬀer in the number of goods they have access to. Since by assumption all consumers
have the same income, and since all goods have the same price, consumers with access to more
goods will buy less of each good. The quantity of each good bought by a consumer who has access











As for aggregate welfare, the characterization of the properties of the distribution F (M) in Jackson
and Rogers (2007) allows me to describe both aggregate sales and the sales distribution across
ﬁrms.
First, the higher the total number of links formed at birth, m, the less a ﬁrm will sell to any
single consumer. This result simply derives from the fact that the more alternatives a consumer
has, the fewer goods she will buy from any single supplier. Second, the higher the ratio of random
to network-based meetings, r, the less a ﬁrm will sell to any single consumer. This result derives
from the fact that the higher r, the less dispersed the distribution F (M) is; moreover, a ﬁrm can
increase its expected sales by shifting away from consumers who have many alternatives towards
consumers who have few alternatives; as a consequence, the more dispersed the distribution F (M)
is, the more a ﬁrm can sell to individual consumers on average.
Note however that this simple model does not generate any interesting predictions on the
intensive margin of sales, i.e. the average sales per consumer. More precisely, in expectation,
the consumers reached by any ﬁrm have access to the same number of goods, irrespective of the
number of consumers this ﬁrm reaches. Therefore, in expectation, all ﬁrms will sell the same
quantities (and values) per consumer, irrespective of how many consumers a ﬁrm reaches. This
result is obviously at odds with the fact that ﬁrms that sell to many markets tend to sell large
quantities in each of these markets.
I leave an extension of this model that would incorporate a meaningful intensive margin of
trade for future research.
44B.2 Trading under the threat of moral hazard
In this section, I propose a simple model with informational asymmetries and moral hazard that
explains why a given ﬁrm would only trade with ﬁrms it has met through the network described in
Section 1. Note that this model is meant only as an illustration of a possible economic mechanism
that would support the proposed dynamic network formation. As a consequence, the model is
purposefully simple.
Set-up: There is a continuum of ﬁrms of mass 1. Each ﬁrm produces a diﬀerentiated good.
Each ﬁrm can both buy diﬀerentiated inputs from other ﬁrms and sell its diﬀerentiated output to
other ﬁrms. A good can be of either high quality (qH) or low quality (qL). Producing high quality
goods is costly. The quality of a good is observable and can be contracted upon.
When a supplier meets a buyer, the match speciﬁc cost to the supplier of customizing its good
for the client is c. The cost c is drawn over R+ from a known probability distribution G,
Pr(˜ c<c )=G(c)
For simplicity, I assume that the distribution of customization costs is independent across matches.
This cost c is only observable to the supplier, and cannot be contracted upon. I normalize the
cost of producing a low quality good to zero.
Ah i g hq u a l i t yi n p u th a sav a l u eV for the client. The value of a low quality good for a client
is normalized to zero. I assume for simplicity that those values are the same for all ﬁrms.
Upon a successful match, one unit of output is traded. All ﬁrms are risk neutral.
Upon meeting, the timing of the game played by a supplier and its client is as follows:
1. The client oﬀers a price for a high quality good, and a price for a low quality good.
2. The supplier receives a customization cost draw, c, and decides whether to produce a high
or low quality good.
3. After observing the good’s quality, the client and supplier trade at the agreed prices.
I will look for sub-game perfect Nash equilibria of this game.
Solution to the match speciﬁc game: The supplier will produce a high quality good for any
price above its cost draw. This happens with probability G(pH). Conditional on receiving a
45high quality good, the surplus of the client is (V − pH). The client therefore chooses p∗
H so as to





Since a low quality good has no value, the client sets p∗
L =0 , and no low quality good is ever








Random meetings and search frictions: Each period, suppliers engage in a costly search for
potential clients. The marginal cost of ﬁnding a new client for a supplier is given by s(m), with
s(0) = 0, s ≥ 0, s￿ > 0 and limm→∞ s(m)=+ ∞. Given the expected proﬁt from ﬁnding a
successful match S, a supplier will sample a mass Mr of ﬁrms at random, deﬁned by s(Mr)=S.
Given that a successful match is formed with a probability G(p∗
H) with each client met, a supplier








Note that I do not consider the role of geography in this simple example. It would be trivial to
add a geographic dimension, where the Mr matches, and the subset of mr successful matches, are
distributed over space according to the p.d.f. g.
Network-based meetings: Given the search frictions, clients who themselves are suppliers to
other clients are in a privileged position to leverage the information about their own network of
clients. The game played by the upstream supplier, her client, and the downstream clients of her
client is similar to the game above. The initial client makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to each of





After being connected, the supplier and her new client bargain as above, and the new client sets
a price p∗
H for a high quality good, which the supplier accepts only if her match speciﬁc cost draw
is below p∗
H. S is exactly the surplus that a supplier can expect from meeting with a random
client. Since the initial client does not observe the cost c that the supplier would have to incur to
customize her good for a new client, no additional information permeates. Moreover, the initial
client extracts all the information rent from the supplier.
56Note that an interior solution exists under some regularity conditions on V and G(·). V =4and G(c)=1−1/c
for instance admits the simple solution p
∗
H =2 .
46Each period, a supplier will therefore meet a fraction G(p∗
H) of the clients of each of her
own clients. Given the implicit assumption about constant returns to scale, there is no strategic
consideration for initial clients to reveal (at a cost) their own client base to their suppliers. They
simply extract a fee for each contact they reveal, without the fear of losing their own contacts.
Discussion: The proposed model would explain why each period, ﬁrms search for a ﬁxed
number of contacts at random, and in addition, get connected to a subset of the contacts of
their contacts. The dynamic network that arises from this set-up is more realistic but also more
complicated than the one proposed in Section 1, since each period, any new contact acquired
by a ﬁrm in the existing network of a supplier may be revealed to the supplier. The simplifying
assumption of having the network evolving only on the in-degree side (with the out-degree acquired
once and for all at birth) is lost. However, the main force that generates a fat tailed network
remains: ﬁrms that already have many contacts are more likely to acquire new contacts. And
the force that keeps the network from being a scale-free network also remains: each period, ﬁrms
always have an incentive to look for contacts at random.
The study of such a more realistic but also more complex dynamic network is left for future
research.
B.3 Comparison with existing trade models
In this section, I derive formally the predictions of the two most prominent existing ﬁrm level
trade models, Melitz (2003) and Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003), regarding the cross-
sectional distribution of the number of foreign markets reached by French exporters. I show that
neither of those models makes any robust prediction regarding this distribution, unless some ad-
hoc assumption about all the exogenous parameters of those models is made. I argue that there
is no a priori reason to make any such ad hoc assumption.
Comparison with Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008)
Strictly speaking, the model developed in Melitz (2003) predicts a degenerate distribution
f (M) where all exporters export to each and every country in the world. This is due obviously
to the simplifying assumption that all trade barriers, country sizes and labor productivities are
perfectly symmetric. Chaney (2008) develops a simple extension of Melitz (2003) with asymmetric
countries and trade barriers. I will describe the prediction of this model regarding the p.d.f. f (M).
Set-up: As a reminder, the set-up in Chaney (2008) is as follows. I will only describe the
47patterns of entry of French exporters into foreign countries. Preferences are CES with an elasticity






where wF is the French wage, τF,m and fF,m are respectively the variable and ﬁxed cost of exporting
to country m for a French ﬁrm. Productivities are distributed Pareto,
Pr(Φ ≤ ϕ)=1− ϕ−γ




















n,m , Y the world GDP,a n dYm the
GDP of country m. There is a strict ordering of the productivity thresholds faced by French ex-
porters. Without loss of generality, I can rearrange countries in increasing productivity thresholds,
so that ϕF,m > ϕF,m￿ iif m>m ￿. Any ﬁrm with a productivity above ϕF,m exports at least to all
markets m￿ ≤ m.
Prediction regarding the p.d.f. f (M): The fraction of ﬁrms that export to exactly M markets
is simply given by the probability of receiving a productivity ϕ above ϕF,M but strictly below
ϕF,M+1. A ﬁrm with such a productivity will export to all countries m ≤ M (there are exactly M
of them), but not to any country m>M. Using the assumption of Pareto distributed productivity

























The only prediction of this model is that this density is non negative (it may be zero if the knife-edge
case where two productivity thresholds are exactly equal arises). It is easy to see from this formula










































F,M+1 ). There is no reason a priori that the
function f (M) is even decreasing in M: if the thresholds of entry for two relatively accessible
48countries are arbitrarily close, and the thresholds of entry into two relatively inaccessible countries
are arbitrarily distant, then f (M) will be upward sloping.
One may argue that country sizes (the YM’s) are approximately Pareto distributed. One may
further argue that the ﬁxed export costs are approximately linear in country size, or at least linear
in logs. In such a case, and in the absence of variable trade barriers, the thresholds of entry into
diﬀerent foreign markets would be Pareto distributed. Formally, in such a case, one can write
ϕM = αMβ,s ot h a tf (M)=α
￿
M−βγ − (M + 1)
−βγ
￿
.F o r βγ ≈ 1.5, this relationship would
describe the data relatively well. Whereas this relationship does not exhibit the curvature in a
log-log scale that we see in the data, the predicted line is close to the empirical distribution f (M).
However, this argument abstracts entirely from the existence of variable trade barriers. Such
a model would make the counter-factual prediction that the number of French exporters is log-
proportional to country size. Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2010) show that French exporters
tend to cluster in countries that are geographically close to France, whether large or small, and
not in potentially much larger countries that are faraway from France. In other words, they show
evidence that variable trade barriers do play an important role in shaping the entry of French
exporters into foreign markets, or that ﬁxed export costs are not proportional to country size. For
instance, in 1986, 17,695 French ﬁrms export to Belgium, with a GDP of $144 billion; 14,579
export to Germany, with a GDP of $1.01 trillion; and 7,608 export to the U.S., with a GDP
of $4.43 trillions. So Belgium, which is 31 times smaller than the U.S. attracts more than twice
as many French exporters as the U.S. It is 7 times smaller than Germany but still attracts 20%
more French exporters. Germany, which unlike Belgium is a non French speaking country, is 4.5
times smaller than the U.S. but receives twice as many French exporters. Even comparing two
English speaking countries that are not contiguous to France, the U.K. with a GDP of $570 billion
is almost 8 times smaller than the U.S., but receives 30% more French exporters, not 87% less.
These massive departures from a linear relationship between country size and number of French
exporters are not restricted to these 4 countries, but occur systematically. Empirically, there is
no systematic correlation between country size (measured as GDP) and the distance from France.
So there is no reason to believe that the thresholds of entry into diﬀerent markets are themselves
Pareto distributed.
To illustrate this point, using the very same data on French manufacturing exporters in 1986
as Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2010), I get the following numbers for the density f (M) for
M =1 ,...,6:
49Figure 6: Network versus Melitz/Chaney model, f (M) versus M.
Notes: f (M) is the fraction of ﬁrms exporting to M destinations; blue dots: data, all French exporters in 1992;
red line: calibrated network model; red plus signs: calibrated Melitz/Chaney model.
f (1) = 3,120 f (4) = 891
f (2) = 406 f (5) = 1,458
f (3) = 3,530 f (6) = 686
Evidently, the theoretical predictions of the Melitz/Chaney model regarding the number of foreign
markets reached by individual ﬁrms are at odds with the data. The predicted density f (M) is
not even decreasing in M,a si ti si nt h ed a t a .
To further illustrate this point, I calibrate the Melitz/Chaney model so as to match exactly the
number of French exporters in every foreign market. I use the same data on all French exporters
in 1992 that I used in Section 2. Given the precise ordering of foreign markets predicted by the
model, I can rank foreign markets in decreasing order of accessibility for French exporters. The
number of ﬁrms that export to exactly M markets is then the diﬀerence between the number of
ﬁrms that export to the Mth and (M + 1)
th market. As can be seen visually on Figure 6, the
Melitz/Chaney model cannot replicate the empirical distribution of the number of foreign markets
50accessed by individual ﬁrms.
I can also describe the predictions of the Melitz/Chaney model regarding the geographic dis-
persion of exports. In the Melitz/Chaney model, more productive ﬁrms are able to enter both more
markets, and less accessible markets. Since less accessible markets tend to be geographically more
remote, this model predicts that the geographic dispersion of exports tends to be larger among
ﬁrms that export to many markets. However, to generate such a prediction, the Melitz/Chaney
model again relies on a series of exogenous parameters that this model has nothing to say about
a priori. Therefore, this model does not deliver any precise predictions regarding the shape of
the relationship between geographic dispersion and the number of markets accessed. To illustrate
this point, I calibrate the geographic dispersion of exports, ∆2 (M), in the Melitz/Chaney model.
I control for country size in the same way as I do when constructing the empirical measure of
∆2 (M) presented in Appendix C.2 on page 58. I order foreign markets in decreasing order of
accessibility for French exporters, controlling for market size as follows: call NM the number of




The Melitz/Chaney model predicts that any ﬁrm that exports to exactly M markets will export
to all countries c ≤ M. The predicted geographic dispersion of exports among ﬁrms that export







As can be seen visually on Figure 7, the Melitz/Chaney can only predict that the geographic
dispersion of exports tends to increase with the number of foreign markets accessed, but it has
nothing to say about the speciﬁc shape of this relationship. Not controlling for market size, the
empirical ﬁt of the Melitz/Chaney model would be substantially worse.57
Note of course that the Melitz/Chaney model is not only meant to explain the extensive margin
of international trade (the number of foreign markets accessed by exporters), but it also delivers a
series of predictions on the intensive margin of international trade (the size of ﬁrm level exports),
on how the size of sales in the domestic market helps predict which markets a ﬁrm enters, and
how much it exports there. As shown by Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2010), these predictions
are strongly supported by the data.
57Calibration available from the author upon request.
51Figure 7: Network versus Melitz/Chaney model, ∆2 (M) versus M.
Notes: ∆
2 (M) is the second moment of the distance from a ﬁrm’s export destinations, among ﬁrms exporting to
M destinations; blue dots: data, all French exporters in 1992; red line: calibrated network model; red plus signs:
calibrated Melitz/Chaney model.
To conclude, not only would the Melitz/Chaney model require ad hoc assumptions regarding
the exogenous parameters of the model (which the Melitz/Chaney model has nothing to say about)
to match the data, but there is no empirical ground for making such ad hoc assumptions.
Comparison with Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003)
Whereas in Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003), the formula for the fraction of ﬁrms
that export to country m is almost identical to the formula in Chaney (2008), there is not a
strict hierarchy of foreign markets in terms of accessibility to French exporters. As a consequence,
the formula for the fraction of ﬁrms that export to exactly M markets is substantially more
complicated.
In the interest of clarity, I will therefore solve a simple special case with 3 countries (potentially
asymmetric in labor productivity), and symmetric trade barriers. All the intuition derived in this
special case carry over to the case of many countries with asymmetric bilateral trade barriers.
52Set-up: As a reminder, the set-up in Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003) is as follows.
There is a continuum of sectors that produce diﬀerentiated goods. The distribution of labor
productivity z of the most productive ﬁrm in country m in any of those sectors is Fréchet,




The parameter θ is the same across countries, but Tm diﬀers across countries. Note that there is
a one-to-one mapping between the parameter Tm and the GDP of country m. Productivity draws
are independent across countries. Firms face no extra cost of selling domestically, but they face
an iceberg cost τ when exporting to any foreign country.
Prediction regarding the p.d.f. f (M): Let us set country 1 as France, and compute the fraction
of French ﬁrms that sell in 1, 2 or 3 markets.
All ﬁrms with a productivity z1 > max{τz2,τz 3} sell in all three markets. With independent
Fréchet distributions, the probability of such an event occurring, and therefore the fraction of ﬁrms
from 1 that export to exactly three markets, f (3), is given by,
f (3) =
T1
T1 + τθT2 + τθT3
A ﬁrm in country 1 sells in exactly two markets if either it is the best in country 1 and 2, but not
in 3, or it is the best in country 1 and 3, but not in 2. Formally, a ﬁrm with productivity z1 sells in
exactly two markets if either {z1/τ > z2 and z1/τ < z3 <z 1} or {z1/τ > z3 and z1/τ < z2 <z 1}
are true. The respective probabilities of each of those mutually exclusive events are,
Pr{z1/τ > z2 and z1/τ < z3 <z 1} =
T1
T1 + τθT2 + T3
−
T1
T1 + τθT2 + τθT3
Pr{z1/τ > z3 and z1/τ < z2 <z 1} =
T1
T1 + T2 + τθT3
−
T1
T1 + τθT2 + τθT3
The fraction of ﬁrms from 1 that export to exactly two markets, f (2), is given by,
f (2) =
T1
T1 + τθT2 + T3
−
T1
T1 + τθT2 + τθT3
+
T1
T1 + T2 + τθT3
−
T1
T1 + τθT2 + τθT3
The formula for the fraction of ﬁrms that sell in exactly one market (in the home market neces-
sarily) is even more complicated, and contains a total of 16 terms. I will spare the reader and skip
this formula, concentrating instead on exporters only. Note the slight abuse of notation due the
fact that there is a non empty set of ﬁrms which, despite being the most productive among home
ﬁrms, do not sell in any market (not even at home). The exact fractions of ﬁrms selling to exactly
532 and 3 markets are the above formulas divided by the same number, the probability of selling in
at least one market.
From the formulas above, it is easy to see that the distribution f (M) does not even have
to be downward sloping. As trade barriers become inﬁnitely large (τ → +∞),n oﬁ r mi sa b l e
to export anywhere, f (2) = f (3) = 0, and all ﬁrms sell at home, f (1) = 1.O n t h e o p p o s i t e
extreme, when trade barriers vanish (τ → 1), any ﬁrm that survives will sell in all three markets,
f (3) = T1
T1+T2+T3, but no ﬁrm sells to exactly 1 or 2 markets, f (1) = f (2) = 0.I n t h e ﬁ r s t
case, the distribution f (M) is decreasing in M, whereas in the second case, it is increasing in M.
Moreover, whereas the fraction of ﬁrms able to enter all 3 markets monotonically decreases with
the level of trade barriers, τ, the fraction of ﬁrms that sell to exactly 2 markets is not monotone
in the level of trade barriers. f (2) increases in τ for τ small, and decreases in τ for τ large.
For diﬀerent levels of trade barriers, the fraction of ﬁrms that sell to exactly 2 markets will be
alternatively larger or smaller than the fraction of ﬁrms selling to 3 markets.
As in the Melitz/Chaney model, the distribution f (M) in the Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and
Kortum model not only can take any shape, but does not even have to be downward sloping. The
speciﬁc shape of this distribution depends on ad hoc assumptions regarding the distribution of
exogenous parameters (country sizes or relative productivities, Tm’s, and bilateral trade barriers,
τnm’s), about which the model has nothing to say.
CD a t a
In this section, I describe the source and construction of the data. I provide some descriptive
statistics in addition to what is presented in the main body of the paper. And I perform a series
of robustness checks.
C.1 Data sources
In this section, I describe the various sources for the data that I use in Section 2.
Firm level export data
The data on ﬁrm level exports come from the French customs, and are described in greater
detail in Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2010). Until 1992, all shipments crossing the French border
are reported, either by the owner of the (exporting) ﬁrm, or by authorized customs commissioners.
54Information about the identity of the exporting ﬁrm, the value of the shipment, the industrial
sector, and the destination country is recorded. This information is then aggregated over a year. I
use data on all French exporters (including non manufacturing ﬁrms).58 A data point is therefore
a ﬁrm, year, destination country and value of exports (in French Francs) vector. Since I am
primarily interested in the extensive margin of exports, I do not use information on the value of
exports.
In addition, the customs data are matched with balance sheet information collected by the
French ﬁscal authorities. All ﬁrms with a turnover of 1,000,000 French Francs in services, or
3,000,000 French Francs in manufacturing are mandated to report this information. Virtually all
exporters are included in this data set. I use information on annual sales, employment, and capital
expenditure.
I restrict my sample of ﬁrms to exporters only.
Distance data
I use data on bilateral distances between countries collected and constructed by the CEPII.
The distance between two countries is calculated as a weighted arithmetic average of the geodesic
distances between the main cities in these countries, where population weights are used. Data on
the location of the main cities in each country (latitude and longitude), as well as the population
of those main cities are used to compute those distances. The construction of the data is described
in further details by Mayer and Zignago (2006) at http://www.cepii.fr/distance/noticedist_
en.pdf.
Country size data
I use as a measure of a country’s size its nominal GDP (in US$) in the current year. The
data are collected from the Penn World Tables and are described in further detail at http:
//pwt.econ.upenn.edu/.
Bilateral trade ﬂows
To proxy for the intensity of ﬁrm level contacts between countries other than France, I use
data on bilateral trade ﬂows between countries. The data correspond to the nominal value (in
US$) of aggregate trade ﬂows between country pairs. The data are collected from the NBER, and
are described in further detail in Feenstra et al. (2004).
58Restricting the sample to manufacturing ﬁrms does not alter the results signiﬁcantly.
55C.2 Data construction
In this section, I describe and discuss in detail how I construct several empirical measures that I
use in Section 2.
Construction of the p.d.f. f (M) used in Section 2.2
The empirical test of Proposition 2 simply uses the fraction of ﬁrms exporting to exactly M
markets as a proxy for the fraction of ﬁrms with exactly M contacts. Below, I show formally how
to correct for the fact that some ﬁrms may have more than 1 contact per market.
Consider the following simpliﬁed set-up. There are N distinct countries, each populated by the
same number of ﬁrms. These ﬁrms are connected to one another by the directed network described
in Section 1. The distribution of the number of contacts M is therefore given by the c.d.f. F (M)
given in Proposition 2. Assume for simplicity that physical geography does not matter, so that
any contact is equally likely to be located in any of the N countries, and that the location of
any two contacts are independent from one another. In other words, there is a probability 1/N
that a given contact is located in a given country, and those probabilities are independent across
contacts.59
Consider now the following question: what is the probability, Pr(n|M), that a ﬁrm with M
contacts has contacts in n distinct countries?
For a given number of contacts M, there are NM equiprobable distinct ways of distributing M







diﬀerent ways of choosing n countries out of the total of N countries. Call
G(M,n) the number of distinct ways to assign each of the M contacts into n countries. The










The number G(M,n) is deﬁned recursively as follows. There are two mutually exclusive cases.
In the ﬁrst case, the ﬁrst M −1 contacts are assigned to only n−1 countries. In that case, the last
Mth contact must necessarily be assigned to the nth country. There are n equiprobable such cases,
59In the model, contacts are spatially correlated, so that some conﬁgurations of contacts are more likely than
others. Not accounting for this spatial correlation may induce a downward bias in the estimated number of contacts.
Despite this, I keep the assumption of equiprobable conﬁgurations for tractability. Numerical simulations suggest
that this bias is not systematically diﬀerent for ﬁrms with many or few contacts, so that the estimation of the
parameters does not suﬀer much from this simplifying assumption.
56one for each nth missing last country. There are G(M − 1,n− 1) ways to assign n−1 countries to
M −1 contacts, n candidate countries that can be missing for the last contact. There are therefore
nG(M − 1,n− 1) distinct ways of assigning n countries to M contact in that ﬁrst case. In the
second case, the ﬁrst M − 1 contacts are assigned to n countries. We can then assign the last
contact to any one of the n countries. There are therefore nG(M − 1,n) distinct ways of assigning
n countries to M contacts in that second case. The number G(M,n) is deﬁned recursively as,
G(M,n)=n[G(M − 1,n− 1) + G(M − 1,n)]
with the initial conditions G(M,M)=M! and G(M,1) = 1. Noting that the known Stirling
number of the second kind, S2 (M,n), is deﬁned recursively in a similar fashion,
S2(M,n)=S2(M − 1,n− 1) + nS2(M − 1,n)
with the initial conditions S2 (M,M)=1and S2 (M,1) = 1, I get the following relationship
between the numbers G(M,n) and S2 (M,n),
G(M,n)=n!S2 (M,n)
I can now answer the question of interest: given that the number of contacts, M, is distributed
according to the distribution F (M), and that there are N equal sized countries, what is the
distribution of the number of countries, n, accessed by diﬀerent ﬁrms?
Obviously, a ﬁrm that has M contacts can export to at most M diﬀerent countries. But for
any M>1, the probability that two diﬀerent contacts fall into the same country is positive, and
increases with M. In other words, among ﬁrms with contacts in n distinct countries, there are
ﬁrms with n, n +1 ,n+2 ,...contacts.
The fraction of ﬁrms that have exactly M contacts is simply given by the p.d.f. f (M),
associated with the c.d.f. F (M) deﬁned in Proposition 2. Given the distribution of the number
of countries reached by a ﬁrm with M contacts, Pr(n|M), the fraction of ﬁrms that have contacts





















57For a given total number of countries, N, observing only the number of countries where a ﬁrm
exports to, n, but not directly the total number of contacts of the ﬁrm, M, one can estimate the
parameters ￿ (r,m) that govern the underlying distribution of the number of contacts, F (M).I
present the results of this corrected estimation in Appendix C.3 on the next page.
Construction of ￿ ∆2 (M) used in Section 2.3
To bring Proposition 3 to the data, I need to measure the geographic dispersion of a ﬁrm’s
foreign contacts, ∆2 (M). The construction of this measure is as follows.
Using data for the year 1992, I calculate the following empirical counterpart to ∆2 (M),t h e

















× I{exporti,c > 0}
where GDPc is country c’s GDP, (DistanceFr,c)
2 is the squared distance (in 1,000’s of km’s)
between France and country c, I{exporti,c > 0} is an indicator function taking the value 1 if ﬁrm
i exports to country c, E (M) is the set of ﬁrms exporting to exactly M foreign markets, and C is
the set of all the countries for which I have information on GDP and distance from France. This
is the exact empirical counterpart of the second moment of the distance from a ﬁrm’s export, with
each observation weighted by the inverse of the country size.
The justiﬁcation for using this empirical measure of the geographic dispersion of exports for
diﬀerent types of ﬁrms is twofold.
First, following the guidance of the model, I simply assume that among all ﬁrms exporting
to M foreign countries, each observed export destination is an independent draw from the same
distribution fM.60 ￿ ∆2 (M) is simply the empirical second moment of this distribution fM.N o t e
that I have a large number of observations to calculate each ￿ ∆2 (M). When M is small, there are
many ﬁrms in E (M), and when M is large, even though few ﬁrms are able to export to many
markets, I can observe the geographic distribution of their exports into many diﬀerent foreign
markets.
Second, I weight each observation by the inverse of the destination country size (1/GDPc).
The reason is that larger countries are, not surprisingly, more likely export destinations than
60fM is the distribution fτ for τ such that Mτ = M.
58small countries.61 In order not to give any systematic salience to large countries, that may not be
evenly distributed over space, I correct for the impact of country size. Note however that since
country size (GDPc) and distance from France (DistanceFr,c) are not systematically correlated,
this correction does not change the results in a signiﬁcant way. See Appendix C.3 below for such
robustness checks.
C.3 Robustness checks
In this section, I perform a series of robustness checks on the main empirical ﬁndings of Section 2.
Cross-section: f (M) versus M
To check the robustness of the results presented in Section 2.2, I replicate the estimations in
columns (1)-(3) in Table 1 for each year, from 1986 to 1992. That is, I estimate separately for each
year the prediction from Proposition 2 regarding the cross-sectional distribution of the number of
foreign contacts using Maximum Likelihood after controlling for the fact that I observe countries
and not contacts. In addition, I estimate the parameters using Maximum Likelihood and Non
Linear Least Squares under the simplifying that ﬁrms have a single contact per country where
they export.
The results are presented in Table 4. All estimated parameters are statistically diﬀerent from
zero at the 1% level of signiﬁcance.62 Except for the year 1986 where the estimated parameters
are somewhat higher in the NLLS estimation, the coeﬃcients are virtually identical across years,
and do not diﬀer much across the diﬀerent estimation procedures. This suggests ﬁrst that the
results are robust, and second that the system of French exporters is in a steady state over the
period considered.
Cross-section: ∆2 (M) versus M
To check the robustness of the results presented in Section 2.3, I estimate the relevant parameter
∆2
0 using diﬀerent empirical measures of ∆2 (M) and diﬀerent samples of ﬁrms.
The results are presented in Table 5. For each year between 1986 and 1992, I separately esti-
mate the parameter ∆2
0. To do so, I use the formula for ∆2 (M) derived in Proposition 3, imposing
the parameter r×m which is estimated on the cross-sectional distribution of the number of foreign
61This would be the case in most existing ﬁrm level trade models. It is the case in the proposed model where a
large country is populated by many ﬁrms, so that the probability of acquiring a contact there is large.
62Estimated standard errors and statistical tests available from the author upon request.
59Table 4: Empirical ﬁt of Proposition 2, robustness checks
Year (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992)
Maximum Likelihood Estimation with Correction of ϕ(n):
r 1.45 1.49 1.64 1.64 1.68 1.71 1.65
(.020) (.020) (.023) (.023) (.024) (.024) (.022)
m 4.19 4.12 3.91 3.93 3.88 3.81 3.83
(.022) (.021) (.020) (.019) (.019) (.019) (.019)
log(lik.) -285,711 -297,839 -268,454 -280,670 -270,464 -277,844 -282,098
Maximum Likelihood Estimation of f (M):
r 1.61 1.64 1.81 1.80 1.86 1.89 1.82
(.022) (.022) (.026) (.025) (.026) (.026) (.025)
m 4.04 3.98 3.79 3.82 3.76 3.68 3.71
(.020) (.019) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.017) (.017)
log(lik.) -285,653 -297,774 -268,388 -280,602 -270,395 -277,770 -282,022
Non Linear Least Squares Estimation of f (M):
r 1.75 1.54 1.56 1.60 1.59 1.61 1.58
(.15) (.12) (.15) (.15) (.15) (.14) (.14)
m 5.62 5.20 4.79 4.85 4.72 4.76 4.86
(.46) (.42) (.48) (.47) (.48) (.44) (.44)
Adj. R2 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98
Notes: This table shows the results of the Non Linear Least Square and Maximum Likelihood estimations of the
parameters (r, m) in Proposition 2 for French exporters in all years from 1986 to 1992. The top panel estimates by
maximum likelihood the p.d.f. ϕ(n) using the correction proposed in Appendix C.2 on page 56 for the fact that
the number of countries, n,a n dn o tc o n t a c t si so b s e r v e d .T h em i d d l ep a n e le s t i m a t e sb ym a x i m u ml i k e l i h o o dt h e
p.d.f. f (M) under the simplifying assumption that the number of contacts of a ﬁrm, M,i se q u a lt ot h en u m b e r
of foreign countries. The bottom panel uses the log of the fraction of ﬁrms that export to M markets as the
dependent variable, and estimates (r,m) using a non linear least squares estimation of Proposition 2. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses. All coeﬃcients on this table are statistically diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level
of signiﬁcance.
60contacts in the top panel of Table 4. I estimate ∆2
0 using non linear least squares, weighting each
observation by the precision of the empirical estimate of ∆2 (M). I use two alternative empirical
measures for ∆2 (M).
The top panel of Table 5 uses the same empirical measure of the second moment of the distance
from a ﬁrm’s export destinations, ∆2 (M) as in Section 2.3, where I correct for diﬀerences in GDP
















× I{exporti,c > 0}
where E (M) is the set of ﬁrms that export to M countries, and C is the set of all countries. In
this measure, I discount the number of exporters to a given country c by the GDP of country c,
using the fact that the number of exporters to a country is approximately proportional to country
size.
In the second panel of Table 5, I do not correct for diﬀerences in GDP across countries. The




2 × I{exporti,c > 0}
￿
(i,c)∈E(M)×C I{exporti,c > 0}
where E (M) is the set of ﬁrms that export to M countries, and C is the set of all countries.
However, since there is no systematic correlation between country size and the geographic
distance from France, this correction does not aﬀect the estimated ∆2
0 substantially. The statistical
signiﬁcance of the estimated ∆2
0 is reduced, and the R2 goes down from about 90% to 75% when
I do not control for diﬀerences in GDP. But all the coeﬃcients remain highly signiﬁcant (at the
1% conﬁdence level), and the coeﬃcients themselves do not diﬀer much across both measures.
The estimated coeﬃcients are very stable across the diﬀerent years, and across the two alternative
measures of ∆2 (M). This suggests that the results presented in Section 2.3 are robust. Moreover,
given that I only allow for a single degree of freedom when estimating this relationship, Proposition
3ﬁ n d sar e m a r k a b l ys t r o n gs u p p o r ti nt h ed a t a .
Time-series: PROBIT regression
To check the robustness of the results presented in Section 2.4, I estimate diﬀerent speciﬁcations
of Equation (3). Speciﬁcally, I run a Probit regression of diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the following
61Table 5: Empirical ﬁt of Proposition 3, robustness checks
Year (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992)
∆
2 (M) corrected for GDP diﬀerences:
∆2
0 14.434 14.325 14.602 14.850 15.01 14.819 14.860
(.124) (.121) (.118) (.117) (.103) (.085) (.109)
Adj. R2 0.859 0.888 0.872 0.881 0.887 0.924 0.871
∆
2 (M) not corrected for GDP diﬀerences:
∆2
0 14.437 14.178 14.412 14.730 14.439 14.346 14.384
(.292) (.318) (.335) (.311) (.360) (.401) (.373)
Adj. R2 0.820 0.792 0.784 0.801 0.766 0.736 0.753
Notes: This table shows the non linear least square estimate of ∆
2
0 from Proposition 3, imposing the parameter
r × m estimated by MLE in the top panel of Table 4. The estimation is run separately for each year from 1986 to
1992. The top panel corrects the empirical measure of ∆
2 (M) for diﬀerences in GDP across countries, while the
bottom panel does not. Each point weighted by the square root of the number of observations used to compute
∆
2 (M). Standard errors are in parentheses. All coeﬃcients on this table are statistically diﬀerent from zero at the
1% level of signiﬁcance.
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+ µ × lnDistFr,c+ ν ×
1




+ δ1 × I{exporti,c,t−1 > 0} + δ2 × I{exporti,c,t−2 > 0} + ...
+ Controls + ￿i,c,t (3)
Table 6 shows the results of the Probit estimation of diﬀerent speciﬁcations of Equation (3),
and Table 7 shows the marginal eﬀects of these regressions. With a few exceptions, all coeﬃcients
are statistically signiﬁcant (at the 1% conﬁdence level), and of the expected signs.
The results of these regressions allow me to reject an alternative model. In this alternative
model, ﬁrms either have to acquire a local distribution network to enter foreign countries, or
sell goods to consumers with locally diﬀerentiated tastes. Moreover, the cost of expanding a
62Table 6: Time-series of exports, robustness checks (PROBIT)
Dependent Variable: I {exporti,c,t > 0}
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
N. contactsi,t−1 .0343*** .0293*** .0275*** .0261*** .0259***




Exportsc￿,c,t−1 .0355*** .0406*** .0560*** .0363*** .0359***




Exportsc￿,c,t−2 .0083*** .0001 -.0070*** -.0115***

















|Ci,t−1| -.1477*** -.955*** -.0720*** -.0509*** -.0372***
(.0032) (.0041) (.0053) (.0067) (.00086) ￿
c￿∈Ci,t−2 lnDistc￿,c
|Ci,t−2| -.0740*** -.0582*** -.0470*** -.0432***
(.0039) (.0054) (.0067) (.00089) ￿
c￿∈Ci,t−3 lnDistc￿,c
|Ci,t−3| -.0491*** -.0458*** -.0459***







lnDistFr,c -.3806*** -.2923*** -.2592*** -.2449*** -.2127***




c￿￿=FrlnDistc￿,c .4397*** .3621*** .3387*** .3393*** .2714***
(.0075) (.0078) (.0091) (.0113) (.0140)
lnGDPc,t .1296*** .1154*** .1124*** .1114*** .1146***
(.0008) (.0008) (.0009) (.0010) (.0013)
Control for:





￿ k =1 k =1 ,2 k =1 ,...,3 k =1 ,...4 k =1 ,...5
Constant -3.244*** -3.0227*** -3.0218*** -3.0942*** -2.7457
(.0543) (.0544) (.0616) (.0748) (.0915)
N. obs 16,565,725 12,255,332 8,898,165 5,950,983 3,689,058
N. clusters 34,588 32,589 29,745 23,149 20,488
Pseudo-R2 .5608 .5935 .6073 .6136 .6171
Notes: This table shows the results of the PROBIT estimation of Equation (3) for a panel of all French exporters
between 1986 and 1992. See the description of the variables in Section 2.4 on page 23. Standards errors are
clustered at the ﬁrm level.
∗,
∗∗,a n d
∗∗∗ mean statistically diﬀerent from zero at the 10, 5 and 1% level of
signiﬁcance.
63Table 7: Time-series of exports, robustness checks (PROBIT: marginal eﬀects)
Dep. Var.: I {exporti,c,t > 0} dy/dx
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
N. contactsi,t−1 .0016*** .0014*** .0013*** .0012*** .0012***




Exportsc￿,c,t−1 .0017*** .0019*** .0026*** .0016*** .0016***




Exportsc￿,c,t−2 .0004*** 0 -.0003*** -.0005***

















|Ci,t−1| -.0070*** -.0045*** -.0033*** -.0023*** -.0017***
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0003) (.0004) ￿
c￿∈Ci,t−2 lnDistc￿,c
|Ci,t−2| -.0035*** -.0027*** -.0021*** -.0020***
(.0002) (.0002) (.0003) (.0004) ￿
c￿∈Ci,t−3 lnDistc￿,c
|Ci,t−3| -.0023*** -.0021*** -.0021***







lnDistFr,c -.0181*** -.0136*** -.0120*** -.0110*** -.0097***




c￿￿=FrlnDistc￿,c .0209*** .0169*** .0156*** .0153*** .0124***
(.0003) (.0004) (.0004) (.0005) (.0006)
lnGDPc,t .0062*** .0054*** .0052*** .0050*** .0052***
(.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0001)
Control for:





￿ k =1 k =1 ,2 k =1 ,...,3 k =1 ,...4 k =1 ,...5
Notes: This table shows the marginal eﬀects for the PROBIT estimation of Equation (3) presented in Table 6.
The marginal eﬀect is calculated as dy/dx at the average value of each x in the sample. dy/dx is for a discrete




mean statistically diﬀerent from zero at the 10, 5 and 1% level of signiﬁcance.
64distribution network or local tastes are spatially correlated. In such an alternative model, a ﬁrm
would be more likely to enter at time t a market c that is geographically close to, or that trade a
lot with any market c￿ in which this ﬁrms exported at time t−1. However, in such an alternative
model, conditional on exporting to countries that are either close or trades a lot with c at time
t − 1, the increment in the probability of entering c given that a ﬁrm exports to countries that
are close or trade a lot with c at times t − 2, t − 3,... should decrease rapidly. In my model on
the other hand, any year a ﬁrm exports to country c￿, and conditional on still not exporting to c,
it has the same probability of learning about contacts in c. So controlling for the export status
in c over longer and longer lags, the increment in probability of entering c brought about by the
fact that a ﬁrm exports to countries that are close or trade a lot with c should not systematically
decrease over longer and longer lags.
As can be seen in Columns (2)-(5), there is no systematic tendency for the coeﬃcients β1,...,β 5
and γ1,...,γ 5 on these lags to fall. In Column (5) where I use the maximum number of ﬁve lags
allowed by the data, the coeﬃcients on the lags of export growth, β’s, fall and then increase, while
the coeﬃcients on the lags of distance, γ’s, increase, except for the ﬁfth lag that is insigniﬁcant.
It must be noted however that there is a lot of turnover in the extensive margin of trade at
the ﬁrm level, so that the systematic entry and exit of ﬁrms into diﬀerent markets may obscure
some of these results.
Time-series: structural estimation
The theoretical prediction from the model regarding the law of motion of the number of foreign
contacts can be derived by integrating Equation (1) over R, as presented in Section 2.4,




To structurally test for the assumptions of the model, I estimate by Ordinary Least Squares the
following equation,
(Number of new contacts)i,t+1 = α + βMi,t + Controlsi,t + ￿i,t (4)
where the dependent variable is the number of new countries entered by ﬁrm i between year t
and t +1 , Mi,t is the number of countries where ﬁrm i exports at time t,a n d￿i,t is a normally
distributed error term. Since I do not allow for the death of contacts in the theoretical model, I





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































66The estimation of Equation (4) allows me to recover the structural parameter r × m = α
β.
The results of this estimation are presented in Table 8. In the diﬀerent speciﬁcations, I control
for various measures of a ﬁrm’s growth trajectory. The idea is that ﬁrms that grow on the
domestic market may as well expand abroad, for reasons that are orthogonal to my model of
network formation. I control for diﬀerent combinations and measures of domestic sales growth,
domestic employment growth, and domestic investment growth at the ﬁrm level.
Firms whose domestic sales are increasing are more likely to enter new foreign markets. Em-
ployment growth has some limited but non robust positive impact on the entry into new foreign
markets, whereas investment growth does not seem to have any impact on the entry into foreign
markets. If anything, investment growth deters entry into foreign markets.
The estimation of the various speciﬁcations of Equation (4) give an estimate for r × m that
ranges between 2 (column (1) without any controls) to 5.68 (column (7)). The speciﬁcation that
is characterized by the most signiﬁcant combination of controls, column (6), gives an estimate of
5.5. Given that an entirely diﬀerent set of data is used, this is surprisingly close to r × m ≈ 6.32
estimated from the cross-sectional distribution of the number of foreign contacts.
These ﬁndings suggest that my model of network formation is able to precisely identify the link
between the time-series and the cross-section of individual exporters’s entry into foreign markets.
67